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ABSTRACT 
  As a matter of constitutional doctrine, the right to keep and bear 
arms is coming of age. But although the doctrine has begun to mature 
in the decade since District of Columbia v. Heller, scholars, advocates, 
and judges disagree about (and sometimes simply do not know) how 
to characterize it. 
  This Article is the first comprehensive empirical analysis of post-
Heller Second Amendment doctrine. Beginning with a set of more than 
one thousand Second Amendment challenges, we have coded every 
available Second Amendment opinion—state and federal, trial and 
appellate—from Heller up until February 1, 2016. The dataset is deep 
as well as broad, including dozens of variables regarding the content of 
each challenge, not just whether it prevailed. Our findings help provide 
an objective basis for characterizing Second Amendment doctrine and 
framing new scholarly inquiries. This is a particularly important task 
now, as the Amendment becomes a part of “normal” constitutional law 
and increasingly susceptible to the standard tools of legal analysis.  
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INTRODUCTION 
For at least a generation, the predominant—nearly sole—question 
for Second Amendment law and scholarship was whether the right to 
keep and bear arms extends beyond the organized militia. In District 
of Columbia v. Heller,1 the Supreme Court resolved that question: As 
a matter of constitutional doctrine, the right protects keeping and 
bearing arms for private purposes like self-defense against crime.2 
In the decade since Heller, Second Amendment law, scholarship, 
and advocacy have moved on to new battlefields.3 Disputes about the 
underlying purposes and themes of the Second Amendment remain 
important and, in significant ways, unresolved.4 But most of the 
 
 1. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 2. Id. at 636. 
 3. Eric M. Ruben & Darrell A. H. Miller, Preface: The Second Generation of Second 
Amendment Law & Policy, 80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 4–9 (2017).  
 4. See, e.g., Joseph Blocher & Darrell A.H. Miller, What Is Gun Control? Direct Burdens, 
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important, timely, and difficult questions involve determining what 
kinds of regulations are consistent with the individual right to keep and 
bear arms. An entire field of constitutional doctrine is being built from 
the ground up—a rare challenge and opportunity for judges, lawyers, 
and scholars. 
The maturation of the Second Amendment debate has 
simultaneously required and generated a new set of legal tools. 
Throughout the first generation of the Second Amendment debate, 
many scholars and advocates argued that the right to keep and bear 
arms must be taken seriously as an individual constitutional right.5 The 
underlying materials supporting this argument were not drawn 
primarily from case law—indeed, with the exception of a district court 
opinion that was later overturned, no federal court prior to Heller had 
ever struck down a gun regulation on Second Amendment grounds.6 
Instead, the argument was essentially one from constitutional first 
principles, and it correspondingly made heavy use of constitutional 
text, history, and the like.7 
Those tools are still useful and important. But now that the 
individual right to keep and bear arms is regularly invoked in court—
generating more than one thousand Second Amendment opinions 
since Heller—those involved in the gun debate must also account for 
 
Incidental Burdens, and the Boundaries of the Second Amendment, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 295, 301–
02 (2016) (investigating whether incidental burdens do or should trigger Second Amendment 
scrutiny); see also Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens and the Nature of Judicial Review, 83 U. 
CHI. L. REV. ONLINE 97, 103–07 (2016) (discussing whether the Second Amendment is distinct 
from other rights in that it does not have an equality component). 
 5. See, e.g., STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED: THE EVOLUTION OF 
A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT, at xi–xii, 3–6, 197 (1984); Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing 
Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637, 658–59 (1989). 
 6. Clark Neily, District of Columbia v. Heller: The Second Amendment Is Back, Baby, 
2007–2008 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 127, 140. In United States v. Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d 598 (N.D. 
Tex. 1999), rev’d and remanded, 270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001), the district court declared 18 U.S.C. 
§ 922(g)(8) (2012) (criminalizing possession of a firearm while under a restraining order) 
unconstitutional on its face and held that the Second Amendment guarantees an individual right 
to bear arms. Id. at 614. The Fifth Circuit agreed with the district court that the Second 
Amendment guarantees an individual right to bear arms, but reversed on the basis that the statute 
did not violate that right. Emerson, 270 F.3d at 264–65. 
 7. Treatises, books, collections, law review articles, online articles, and newspaper articles 
account for ninety-four of the 175 sources cited by the majority in Heller. Dictionaries account for 
another six. The remainder includes federal and state cases, state and federal statutes, state 
constitutions, and legislative history. Those ninety-four sources make up 136 of the 270 citations 
in the opinion (150 if one counts dictionaries). We are grateful to Alyssa Rutsch, Duke Law Class 
of 2015, for reviewing the citations. 
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evolving precedent.8 In the first generation of the gun debate, legal 
doctrine was the desired output; now it must be an input as well. If the 
first question was whether to treat the Second Amendment right as 
unconnected to militia service, the second question is how to do so. Put 
simply, the debate has shifted not only in substance, but in 
methodology—generally, from interpretation to construction;9 
meaning to implementation;10 first principles to doctrine. And those 
involved in that debate must therefore work not only to shape doctrine 
but, increasingly, to respect it. 
This does not mean that the kinds of textual, historical, and 
structural inquiries on display in Heller are no longer relevant. Second 
Amendment doctrine can and sometimes does direct decisionmakers 
back to first principles,11 as when determining whether concealed 
carrying falls outside the scope of the Second Amendment because it 
has historically been prohibited.12 But the scope and propriety of these 
inquiries are increasingly circumscribed by precedent, which, as Justice 
Benjamin Cardozo put it, “fix[es] the point of departure from which 
the labor of the judge begins.”13 Precedent has a tendency to crowd out 
other modalities of argument, such as those based on history.14 A 
 
 8. PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 7, 93 (1982); 
PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12–13 (1991) (identifying text, history, 
structure, precedent, consequences, and ethos as the “modalities” with which constitutional 
argument is conducted). 
 9. See Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. 
COMMENT. 95, 100 (2010) (“In general, interpretation recognizes or discovers the linguistic 
meaning of an authoritative legal text.”); id. at 103 (“Conceptually, construction gives legal effect 
to the semantic content of a legal text.”). 
 10. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 5 (2001) (observing 
how judicial “design of implementing strategies” follows “the identification of constitutional 
meaning”). 
 11. Darrell A.H. Miller, Text, History, and Tradition: What the Seventh Amendment Can 
Teach Us About the Second, 122 YALE L.J. 852, 861–63 (2013). 
 12. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008) (“[T]he majority of the 
19th-century courts to consider the question held that prohibitions on carrying concealed 
weapons were lawful under the Second Amendment or state analogues.”); Peruta v. Cty. of San 
Diego, 824 F.3d 919, 927 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (“Based on the overwhelming consensus of 
historical sources, we conclude that the protection of the Second Amendment—whatever the 
scope of that protection may be—simply does not extend to the carrying of concealed firearms in 
public by members of the general public.”); United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680 (4th Cir. 
2010) (“This historical inquiry seeks to determine whether the conduct at issue was understood 
to be within the scope of the right . . . .”). 
 13. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 20 (1921). 
 14. See, e.g., Joseph Blocher & Margaret Lemos, Practice and Precedent in Historical Gloss 
Games, 106 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 1, 5–8 (2017) (arguing that precedent generally displaces arguments 
based on historical practice).  
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federal court of appeals facing a novel Second Amendment question 
might, for example, decline to follow the two-part test that “has 
emerged as the prevailing approach.”15 But doing so would, at the very 
least, call for an explanation.16 
Understanding what Second Amendment doctrine is has 
therefore never been more important.17 The project of this Article is to 
facilitate such an understanding—one that includes not only the result 
of every available Second Amendment opinion (state and federal, trial 
and appellate) from the day Heller was decided until February 1, 
2016,18 but also aspects of the judicial reasoning employed to justify 
those results. In other words, we go beyond the results in Second 
Amendment cases, considering their content as well.19 By analyzing 
reasoning as well as outcomes, we can provide a more complete 
account of the doctrine’s substance and development, while avoiding 
some of the most central objections to case coding projects.20 
 
 15. Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives, 700 
F.3d 185, 194 (5th Cir. 2012); see, e.g., United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1136 (9th Cir. 2013); 
United States v. Greeno, 679 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2012); Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller 
II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1252 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 701–04 (7th Cir. 
2011); Chester, 628 F.3d at 680; United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792, 800–01 (10th Cir. 2010); 
United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010). As we explain in more detail below, 
infra notes 86–93, this two-step inquiry first asks whether the challenged regulation implicates the 
Second Amendment at all, and, if so, whether it is justifiable in light of the individual burden and 
the government interest being served.  
 16. See, e.g., Friedman v. City of Highland Park, Ill., 784 F.3d 406, 410 (7th Cir. 2015) 
(acknowledging Second Amendment doctrine applied by other circuits in challenges to assault 
rifle bans and explaining deviation from it). 
 17. Mark A. Hall and Ronald F. Wright note that empirical content analysis of judicial 
opinions “may not eliminate all disagreement, but at least it sharpens the issues,” and point as an 
illustration to the use of content analysis “to challenge the emerging scholarly consensus that 
promissory estoppel was overtaking consideration as the basis for enforcing contracts.” Mark A. 
Hall & Ronald F. Wright, Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 63, 
85 (2008) (first citing Robert A. Hillman, Questioning the “New Consensus” on Promissory 
Estoppel: An Empirical and Theoretical Study, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 580 (1998); then citing Juliet 
P. Kostritsky, The Rise and Fall of Promissory Estoppel or Is Promissory Estoppel Really as 
Unsuccessful as Scholars Say It Is: A New Look at the Data, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 531 (2002)).  
 18. As noted below, see infra note 114, we coded state trial court opinions, but omitted them 
from the analysis because most state trial courts do not regularly publish opinions on Westlaw.  
 19. By content analysis, we simply mean the method by which “a scholar collects a set of 
documents, such as judicial opinions on a particular subject, and systematically reads them, 
recording consistent features of each and drawing inferences about their use and meaning.” Hall 
& Wright, supra note 17, at 64.  
 20. Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of Empirical Studies that Attempt to 
Understand the Factors Affecting Appellate Decisionmaking, 58 DUKE L.J. 1895, 1926 (2009) (“A 
final, and perhaps the most troubling, problem with coding decisions—and one well recognized 
by many scholars who undertake empirical legal scholarship—is that only the outcomes of the 
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Doing this meant identifying the proper set of Second 
Amendment opinions, asking dozens of questions about each of them, 
and analyzing the results. We designed questions to maximize 
consistency and reliability, employed survey technology, trained 
coders to review the cases, and conducted an independent quality 
review.21 Past systematic reviews and consultations with an empiricist 
played a central part of the process.22 
Our goals are primarily descriptive and analytic.23 But positive and 
normative analysis are unavoidably intertwined here, as in any area of 
constitutional law. Case outcomes reveal, influence, and are shaped by 
normative judgments about the Second Amendment’s proper purpose 
and application. Second Amendment scholarship and commentary are 
particularly riven with fundamental disagreements, some of which are 
insoluble. There is no single way to interpret the twenty-seven words 
of the Amendment, let alone the vast historical materials relating to 
their meaning. That makes it all the more important to be clear about 
the things that are measurable and subject to proof. 
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I establishes the stakes 
and goals of the study. Part II describes the methodology. Parts III and 
IV report and analyze the results. The Conclusion identifies major 
takeaways and potential future avenues of research. 
 
decisions are coded, not the content.”); Lee Epstein, Nancy Staudt & Peter Wiedenbeck, Judging 
Statutes: Thoughts on Statutory Interpretation and Notes for a Project on the Internal Revenue 
Code, 13 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 305, 320–23 (2003) (advocating an approach that codes both 
outcomes and content); Gregory C. Sisk, The Quantitative Movement and the Qualitative 
Opportunity: Legal Studies of Judicial Decision Making, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 873, 885 (2008) 
(concluding that empirical legal scholarship must “move beyond asking which litigant prevailed 
in a case and now also ask how the advocates and the court framed the question presented and 
how the legal analysis unfolded in the opinion”).  
 21. See infra Part II. 
 22. See, e.g., William Baude, Adam S. Chilton & Anup Malani, Making Doctrinal Work 
More Rigorous: Lessons from Systematic Reviews, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 37, 47–51 (2017); Hall & 
Wright, supra note 17, at 64. Although we make no pretensions to having advanced the state of 
the empirical art, our experience confirms the value of consulting existing scholarship for 
methodological guidance. Hall & Wright, supra note 17, at 74 (noting that more than half of legal 
scholars doing content analysis cited no methodological literature at all, and that “[i]n project 
after project, legal researchers reinvent this methodological wheel on their own”); Peter J. 
Hammer & William M. Sage, Antitrust, Health Care Quality, and the Courts, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 
545, 560 (2002) (acknowledging a “tendency for each new enterprise to invent its own wheel, often 
in a fairly ad hoc manner”). We found it particularly useful to learn how others have approached 
questions of survey design, use and training of student coders, and reliability review.  
 23. Theodore Eisenberg, Why Do Empirical Legal Scholarship?, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
1741, 1741 (2004) (concluding that empirical legal studies can “help[] inform litigants, 
policymakers, and society as a whole about how the legal system works”).  
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I.  THE SECOND AMENDMENT COMES OF AGE 
The contemporary Second Amendment is well-suited for 
empirical study. For one thing, the right to keep and bear arms is 
beginning to take shape—the decade since Heller has seen more than 
one thousand lower court challenges testing the boundaries and 
strength of the right.24 Moreover, the debate about gun rights and 
regulation is still rife with broad but unsubstantiated claims about the 
state of the law, often driven by rancor and partisanship. Close reading 
and case coding can provide the kind of objective information that 
might help discipline and professionalize the discussion. 
A. From Should to Is: Why Claims about Second Amendment 
Doctrine Matter 
Ever since Heller, the debate about how the Second Amendment 
should be interpreted and applied has necessarily involved claims 
about how it is treated by the courts. Questions that were exclusively 
the province of scholars and advocates less than a decade ago25 are now 
being resolved by judges. Judicial opinions now address whether a ban 
on “assault weapons” is constitutional,26 whether the right to keep and 
bear arms extends outside the home,27 whether the Second 
Amendment extends to people convicted of misdemeanor crimes of 
domestic violence,28 and so on. As the doctrine comes into focus 
through such opinions, claims by advocates, scholars, and others about 
doctrinal content should become correspondingly more disciplined. As 
we describe in Part I.B, such claims are made frequently, but are rarely 
 
 24. Frank B. Cross, Decisionmaking in the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 
1459, 1459 (2003) (arguing that circuit court decisions are “probably the decisions of greatest 
importance for the development of the law in the United States”). See generally Doni 
Gewirtzman, Lower Court Constitutionalism: Circuit Court Discretion in a Complex Adaptive 
System, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 457, 459–62 (2012) (describing how “lower federal court judges” are 
“active players in the creation of constitutional meaning”). 
 25. See supra notes 5–10. 
 26. See, e.g., Kolbe v. Hogan, 849 F.3d 114, 121 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (finding that certain 
semiautomatic rifles and high capacity magazines are not covered by the Second Amendment). 
In keeping with common practice, we use the phrase “assault weapons,” recognizing that the label 
is imprecise and frequently misunderstood. 
 27. Some have held as much. See, e.g., Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 935–36 (7th Cir. 
2012); Wrenn v. D.C., No. 16-7025, 2017 WL 3138111, at *3 (D.C. Cir. July 25, 2017). Others have 
deferred the question, while upholding the challenged laws on other grounds. See, e.g., Drake v. 
Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 430–32 (3d Cir. 2013); Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 875–76 (4th Cir. 
2013); Kachalsky v. Cty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 89 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 28. See, e.g., United States v. White, 593 F.3d 1199, 1205–06 (11th Cir. 2010) (upholding 
federal ban); United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 639 (7th Cir. 2010) (same). 
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backed up by more than the commentator’s impressions. But they are, 
in important ways, empirical statements, and can be evaluated as such. 
Claiming that a federal Circuit is especially hostile to the Second 
Amendment, for example, can be tested by measuring outcomes and 
doctrine in that Circuit and comparing to others. But such analysis is 
almost never done. 
In the immediate wake of Heller—and, later, McDonald v. City of 
Chicago29—judges, advocates, and commentators disagreed sharply 
about the result and implications. Some predicted (happily or not) a 
wave of litigation and a radical change to the nation’s firearm laws.30 
Others suggested that the cases’ impact would be minimal, given the 
paucity of laws as strict as those struck down in Heller and McDonald.31 
There was, however, broad agreement that the Court had left 
open many important and difficult questions regarding the scope and 
protection of the right to keep and bear arms. At the same time as it 
recognized the existence (and, later, fundamentality) of an individual 
right to keep and bear arms for private purposes like self-defense in 
the home, the Court also noted that this right, “[l]ike most rights, . . . is 
not unlimited.”32 Justice Antonin Scalia’s majority opinion explained: 
  From Blackstone through the 19th-century cases, commentators 
and courts routinely explained that the right was not a right to keep 
and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for 
whatever purpose. For example, the majority of the 19th-century 
courts to consider the question held that prohibitions on carrying 
concealed weapons were lawful under the Second Amendment or 
state analogues. Although we do not undertake an exhaustive 
historical analysis today of the full scope of the Second Amendment, 
nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding 
prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally 
ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such 
as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and 
qualifications on the commercial sale of arms. 
  We also recognize another important limitation on the right to 
 
 29. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010). 
 30. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 680 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(“I fear that the District’s policy choice [that was struck down in Heller] may well be just the first 
of an unknown number of dominoes to be knocked off the table.”). 
 31. See, e.g., Adam Winkler, Heller’s Catch-22, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1551, 1577 (2009) (“A few 
additional extreme laws will be invalidated under the reinvigorated Second Amendment, but 
these, like the D.C. law in Heller, are likely to be outliers.”). 
 32. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626. 
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keep and carry arms. Miller said, as we have explained, that the sorts 
of weapons protected were those “in common use at the time.” We 
think that limitation is fairly supported by the historical tradition of 
prohibiting the carrying of “dangerous and unusual weapons.”33 
These paragraphs were immediately and widely recognized as a key to 
the constitutionality of gun regulation going forward.34 
As expected, post-Heller litigation has focused on justifying, 
limiting, extending, or reasoning by analogy from the restrictions that 
the Court seemed to approve.35 There are, of course, deep debates 
about where the lines should be drawn and how much of a burden the 
government must bear in order to justify particular restrictions. The 
debates are also methodological, involving questions like whether and 
to what degree the analysis should depend on original review of the 
historical record.36 
But in addition to these arguments from first principles, advocates, 
scholars, and judges are also making claims about the state of the 
evolving doctrine. Heller essentially introduced a new constitutional 
right, and recognized the wide range of questions it left open to future 
cases.37 Subsequent decisions have answered some of those questions, 
and have therefore provided further guidance and rules for future 
cases. Just as lower courts are bound vertically by Supreme Court 
precedent, they are also bound horizontally by their own. So when a 
federal court of appeals holds that undocumented immigrants do not 
 
 33. Id. at 626–27 (citations omitted). 
 34. See, e.g., Winkler, supra note 31, at 1561 (“The vast majority of gun control laws fits 
within these categories. So while forcefully declaring an individual right to keep and bear arms, 
the Court suggests that nearly all gun control laws currently on the books are constitutionally 
permissible.”).  
 35. See infra note 240 and accompanying text. 
 36. Compare Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244, 1252 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (upholding gun regulation under 
intermediate scrutiny), with id. at 1271 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (concluding that “Heller and 
McDonald leave little doubt that courts are to assess gun bans and regulations based on text, 
history, and tradition, not by a balancing test such as strict or intermediate scrutiny,” and that the 
laws at issue should be struck down); compare Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 431 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(noting that the court was “not inclined to . . . engag[e] in a round of full-blown historical analysis” 
regarding whether concealed carrying is covered by the Second Amendment), with id. at 449 
(Hardiman, J., dissenting) (concluding on the basis of such an analysis that the “crux of [the] 
historical precedents, endorsed by the Supreme Court, is that a prohibition against both open and 
concealed carry without a permit is different in kind, not merely in degree, from a prohibition 
covering only one type of carry”). 
 37. Heller, 554 U.S. at 635 (“[S]ince this case represents this Court’s first in-depth 
examination of the Second Amendment, one should not expect it to clarify the entire field . . . . 
[T]here will be time enough to expound upon the historical justifications for the exceptions we 
have mentioned if and when those exceptions come before us.”). 
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fall within the Amendment’s scope, or that eighteen- to twenty-one-
year-olds do, it has also effectively determined the outcome of future 
Second Amendment challenges in its circuit. And, considering the 
degree to which courts borrow from one another’s tests, it has perhaps 
even influenced cases outside its jurisdiction.38 
As Second Amendment doctrine has begun to take shape and 
solidify, advocates and scholars have begun to characterize it in general 
terms. These claims are empirical in the sense that they are not 
statements about what the law should be, but what it is. They are 
therefore subject to proof in ways that normative claims about the 
underlying purpose or meaning of the Amendment might not be. 
These factual claims matter, as does their accuracy. Generally 
speaking, falsifiable claims about the content of law should be true. In 
this particular area of law, however, accuracy is especially important. 
The post-Heller Second Amendment is no longer in its infancy, and 
people are starting to form understandings of what Second 
Amendment doctrine is all about. Those impressions, once formed, will 
not be easy to shake. 
And as a practical matter, such beliefs—accurate or not—can have 
a major impact on the future of the Amendment. For example, gun 
rights proponents regularly claim that lower courts are rejecting nearly 
all Second Amendment challenges, refusing to apply Heller’s 
reasoning, or that there is mass confusion in the lower courts.39 All of 
these assertions are then invoked as reasons why the Court should 
grant cert in another Second Amendment case.40 
Such arguments can also be influential in the policy realm. 
Politicians regularly make claims about the content of Second 
Amendment doctrine,41 often suggesting that courts cannot be trusted 
 
 38. To take just one prominent example, the Third Circuit’s decision in United States v. 
Marzzarella is credited as the first to describe the two-part test that has now been adopted across 
the circuits:  
First, we ask whether the challenged law imposes a burden on conduct falling within 
the scope of the Second Amendment’s guarantee. If it does not, our inquiry is complete. 
If it does, we evaluate the law under some form of means-end scrutiny. If the law passes 
muster under that standard, it is constitutional. If it fails, it is invalid. 
United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted) (citing United States 
v. Stevens, 533 F.3d 218, 233 (3d Cir. 2008), aff’d, 559 U.S. 460 (2010)); see N.Y. State Rifle & 
Pistol Ass’n v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242, 254 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2486 (2016) (noting 
that the two-part test had been largely adopted by the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, 
Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits). 
 39. See infra Part I.B.1. 
 40. See infra notes 75–78. 
 41. See, e.g., Senator Ted Cruz at 2017 Conservative Political Action Conference, C-SPAN 
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to enforce the right to keep and bear arms42 or supporting state 
constitutional amendments requiring strict scrutiny for gun rights 
claims.43 
It is not our goal to suggest that all of these claims are falsifiable 
or that Second Amendment doctrine can be reduced to a single 
doctrinal test or soundbite. No other constitutional right can be 
described in such simplistic terms, and it would be too much (or too 
little) to expect such of the right to keep and bear arms. But we think 
it matters that some of these claims are subject to proof. And if Second 
Amendment law, scholarship, and rhetoric are to be disciplined, then 
they should be accurate. 
We are not the first scholars to systematically review and analyze 
lower court cases on the Second Amendment. Three prior projects in 
particular demand close attention. Although none analyzes the same 
breadth of cases as we do, and only one is quantitative, they each 
represent welcome efforts to investigate Second Amendment doctrine 
outside the Supreme Court. 
In the first, Michael P. O’Shea reviews 225 federal appellate and 
trial court opinions to determine “whether the right remains 
underenforced.”44 If so, he argues, a slippery slope from background 
check legislation to firearm confiscation is a plausible concern.45 He 
observes that some judges provide institutional explanations for 
 
(Feb. 23, 2017), https://www.c-span.org/video/?424394-8/senator-ted-cruz-speaks-cpac [https:// 
perma.cc/KLA5-2RHU] (04:36–08:30): 
The Fourth Circuit used to be the most conservative court in the country. . . . . . .The 
Fourth Circuit now, they invented this new test for the Second Amendment and here’s 
what their test says: The Second Amendment doesn’t protect a weapon if it would be 
useful in a military context. . . . This test isn’t just sort of questionable. It isn’t just a 
little bit out there. It’s nuts. . . . This is lawless. And it’s why after eight years of Obama, 
there are few if any things more important than putting principled constitutionalists on 
the Supreme Court. 
 42. See, e.g., AWR Hawkins, Ted Cruz: U.S. Is One Liberal Justice Away From End of Gun 
Rights, BREITBART (Oct. 25, 2015), http://www.breitbart.com/big-government/2015/10/25/ted-
cruz-u-s-one-liberal-justice-away-end-gun-rights/ [https://perma.cc/88EM-3W3K]. 
 43. See, e.g., ALA. POLICY INST., GUIDE TO THE ISSUES, STATEWIDE AMENDMENT 3: THE 
RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT 1 (2014) (“The driving force behind 
Amendment 3 [requiring courts to apply strict scrutiny to gun restrictions] is the growing concern 
at the federal level that courts have become more lenient and may back away from applying strict 
scrutiny to Second Amendment challenges.”). 
 44. Michael P. O’Shea, The Steepness of the Slippery Slope: Second Amendment Litigation in 
the Lower Federal Courts and What It Has to Do with Background Recordkeeping Legislation, 46 
CONN. L. REV. 1381, 1410 (2014). 
 45. Id. at 1408 (“Courts that recognize and credibly enforce constitutional rights provide 
assurance that legislation imposing additional regulation (A) will not be allowed to lead to drastic 
or prohibitory restrictions (B) . . . .”). 
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deferring to legislatures about public safety—a factor that can be 
suggestive of underenforcement.46 In addition, though judges 
nominated by both Republican and Democratic presidents have 
upheld most gun laws, only Republican-nominated judges voted to 
strike any down.47 (This pattern ceased soon after the end of the study 
period.48) O’Shea concludes that the right is being underenforced, 
thereby buttressing fears of a slippery slope.49 
In a more recent review of federal appellate cases, David B. Kopel 
and Joseph G.S. Greenlee describe doctrine being applied in 
challenges to various categories of gun laws.50 Their analysis is more 
normative, generally critiquing decisions perceived to under-enforce 
the Second Amendment. Opinions upholding regulations in the face of 
Second Amendment challenges are characterized as “deservedly 
unpublished,”51 “willful[ly] oblivious[] to the facts,”52 
“schizophrenic,”53 and applying an “eccentric and feeble version of 
heightened scrutiny.”54 Opinions espousing a broad view of the Second 
Amendment, most often dissents, are used to exemplify sound 
doctrine.55 
These first two articles might best be characterized as large-n 
qualitative studies.56 Such qualitative analyses have the potential to 
 
 46. Id. at 1413 (citing Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of 
Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1218–19 (1978)). 
 47. Id. at 1423–24. O’Shea notes one exception that confirms the rule: a former Republican 
congressional staffer appointed by President Clinton as a compromise with Republicans. Id. 
 48. Id. at 1426–27 (counting three opinions in the months after the study period that 
“deviated from the party-of-appointment pattern”). 
 49. Id. at 1425 (noting the “tenor” of decisions “is deeply skeptical, bordering on hostile, to 
claims that the Second Amendment limits government action”). 
 50. David B. Kopel & Joseph G.S. Greenlee, The Federal Circuits’ Second Amendment 
Doctrines, 61 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 193, 196 (2017) (noting that the authors “examined every post-
Heller circuit case, including the unpublished ones”). 
 51. Id. at 254. 
 52. Id. at 298. 
 53. Id. at 299. 
 54. Id. at 268. 
 55. See id. at 206 (citing Friedman v. City of Highland Park, Ill., 784 F.3d 406, 417 (7th Cir. 
2015) (Manion, J., dissenting)); id. at 265 (citing Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 445 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(Hardiman, J., dissenting)); id. at 280 (citing United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1145, 1149 
(9th Cir. 2013) (Bea, J., dissenting)); id. at 286 (citing Jackson v. City of San Francisco, 135 S. Ct. 
2799, 2801 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)); id. at 301 (citing Heller II, 
670 F.3d 1244, 1285 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting)). 
 56. See generally Thomas M. Keck, Medium- and Large-N Qualitative Methods in 
Constitutional Law, in HANDBOOK ON RESEARCH METHODS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
(Malcolm Langford and David Law, eds. forthcoming), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3070348 
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capture the “normative influence of law” that is “difficult to capture in 
statistical research designs.”57 But quantitative designs have their own 
advantages, such as enabling comparisons between discrete variables 
and limiting the subjectivity inherent in qualitative analysis. 
A third review of Second Amendment case law employs 
quantitative analysis and thus has methodological similarities to our 
approach. Adam Samaha and Roy Germano compare federal 
appellate success rates in five areas of constitutional litigation, one of 
which is Second Amendment challenges.58 Samaha and Germano’s 
goal is largely attitudinalist: they ask whether three proxies for judicial 
ideology are predictive of outcomes.59 They conclude that ideology 
“might play a small role” in resolving gun rights claims, but that the 
correlation between ideology and outcomes appears much stronger in 
cases involving abortion rights, the Establishment Clause, and 
affirmative action.60 Samaha and Germano’s analysis also tees up 
interesting questions about the state of Second Amendment litigation, 
including how the high failure rate of Second Amendment claims can 
be explained.61 
We seek to create a more complete picture of the state of Second 
Amendment case law. As described in greater detail in Part II, by 
comprehensively coding all available state and federal trial and 
appellate opinions, and counting nearly one hundred variables for each 
Second Amendment challenge therein, we can provide the most 
detailed account of Second Amendment doctrine to date. Like Samaha 
and Germano, our approach is quantitative. Unlike them, however, we 
make no effort to measure the impact of ideology. 
B. Characterizing Second Amendment Doctrine 
What, then, are the kinds of claims that are commonly made about 
the content of Second Amendment doctrine? We see two major classes 
of claims: broad characterizations of judicial treatment of the right to 
keep and bear arms and more granular characterizations about 
 
[https://perma.cc/ZWU4-WNS8] (describing methodology). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Adam M. Samaha & Roy Germano, Are Commercial Speech Cases Ideological? An 
Empirical Inquiry, 25 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 827, 829 (2017). 
 59. Id. at 849–50 (describing the three proxies: (1) “political party of the appointing 
president,” (2) “Judicial Common Space” scores, and (3) “Database on Ideology, Money in 
Politics, and Elections” scores). 
 60. Id. at 861. 
 61. Id. 
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doctrine. 
1. Overall Characterizations.  Perhaps the most widely accepted 
characterization of Second Amendment challenges as a whole is that 
they have been overwhelmingly rejected.62 As the Law Center to 
Prevent Gun Violence puts it: 
  Regardless of the level of scrutiny that has been applied, nearly all 
of these cases have one thing in common: [T]he Second Amendment 
challenge has been rejected and the statute at issue has been upheld. 
Of the more than 900 cases tracked by the Law Center, 96% have 
rejected the Second Amendment challenge.63 
Closely related to that overall assessment are characterizations 
about regional variations. A common refrain has been that certain 
federal appellate courts—especially the Second, Fourth, and Ninth 
Circuits—are particularly opposed to enforcing the Second 
Amendment right, suggesting a higher failure rate for challenges to gun 
laws there than in other places.64 This characterization is often 
accompanied by emphasis on the political makeup of the court under 
discussion.65 
However one defines success and failure,66 such claims depend in 
 
 62. Id. at 860 (characterizing Second Amendment challenges as “outstanding losers”). 
 63. LAW CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, POST-HELLER LITIGATION SUMMARY 6 (Mar. 
31, 2015), http://smartgunlaws.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Post-Heller-Litigation-Summary-
March-2015-Final-Version.pdf [https://perma.cc/C5RC-ZC3E]. 
 64. See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 21, Silvester v. Harris, 843 F.3d 816 (9th Cir. 
2016), petition for cert. filed sub nom., Silvester v. Becerra, No. 17-342 2017 WL 3948480 (U.S. 
Sept. 1, 2017) (No. 17-342) (“It is no secret that various lower courts, and the Ninth Circuit 
especially, are engaged in systematic resistance to this Court’s Heller and McDonald decisions.”); 
AWR Hawkins, President Trump Can Free Second Amendment From Ninth Circuit’s Grip, 
BREITBART (Jan. 3, 2017), http://www.breitbart.com/big-government/2017/01/03/president-
trump-can-free-2nd-amendment-ninth-circuits-grip/ [https://perma.cc/GUA7-FYG6] (singling 
out the Ninth Circuit as “chipping away at the Second Amendment”); Daniel Horowitz, 4th 
Circuit Limits Second Amendment Right to Own Common Firearms, CONSERVATIVE REV. (Feb. 
22, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://www.conservativereview.com/commentary/2017/02/fourth-circuit-
limits-second-am endment-right-to-possess-common-firearms [https://perma.cc/E5GE-H9J9]; 
David Kopel, The 2nd Circuit’s Second-Class Second Amendment Intermediate Scrutiny, WASH. 
POST (Oct. 23, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/10/23/ 
the-2nd-circuits-second-class-second-amendment-intermediate-scrutiny [http://perma.cc/ZW7Z-
RFD] (suggesting that the Second Circuit is applying a uniquely deferential version of scrutiny to 
uphold gun laws against Second Amendment challenges). 
 65. See, e.g., Horowitz, supra note 64. 
 66. As explained in more detail below, infra notes 136–40 and accompanying text, we focus 
on the failure rate, counting as a “success” any challenge that is not rejected, including those that 
simply survive a motion for summary judgment or motion to dismiss. Such claims might ultimately 
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part on facts. As we note below, it is true that the vast majority of 
Second Amendment claims fail, but it is also true that the Second, 
Fourth, and Ninth Circuits—those typically criticized as being hostile 
to gun rights—upheld Second Amendment claims at a higher rate than 
the overall average.67 Moreover, the meaning and significance of 
failure rates, including whether Second Amendment claims are being 
treated fairly by courts, also depends in part on empirical facts. Is the 
failure rate high because so many objectively weak claims are 
brought—for example, by people who Heller carves out of Second 
Amendment coverage, but who have nothing to lose by raising 
constitutional claims, like convicted felons-in-possession? (We find the 
answer to be a partial yes.68) Or, in contrast, are there indicia that the 
failure rate is high because judges are hostile to the right to keep and 
bear arms? 
The latter has become a central talking point for many who favor 
broad gun rights.69 Indeed, it is perhaps the most common argument in 
favor of granting cert in another Second Amendment case. In 
McDonald, the plurality opinion noted that the Second Amendment is 
not a “second-class right.”70 Judges, advocates, and scholars frequently 
invoke that language in the course of suggesting that a particular court 
has interpreted the right to keep and bear arms too narrowly.71 Perhaps 
 
fail in a later opinion. In that case, the earlier case outcome (say, surviving a motion to dismiss) 
would be coded as a success and the later outcome would be coded as a failure.  
 67. See infra Table 1 (showing overall success rate of 9 percent) and Table 2 (showing that 
Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits have higher success rates). 
 68. See infra Part III.A.2 (finding that nearly two thirds of challenges are brought by criminal 
defendants, who have a success rate of only 6 percent) and Part III.A.3 and Appendix C, 
https://dlj.law.duke.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2018/04/Ruben-and-Blocher-App-C-1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9PQG-7WY6] (showing that out of that 273 challenges to felon-in-possession 
statutes—nearly a quarter of the set—just three succeeded, for a 1 percent success rate). 
 69. See, e.g., Robert J. Cottrol & George A. Mocsary, Guns, Bird Feathers, and 
Overcriminalization: Why Courts Should Take the Second Amendment Seriously, 14 GEO. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 17, 33 (2016) (arguing that lower courts are “undercutting . . . Supreme Court 
precedent” in a way that is suggestive of “something other than a desire to control crime”); 
O’Shea, supra note 44, at 1425 (characterizing the “tenor” of lower court Second Amendment 
decisions as “deeply skeptical, bordering on hostile, to claims that the Second Amendment limits 
government action”); Editorial, Waiting for Justice Gorsuch, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 23, 2017, 7:17 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/waiting-for-justice-gorsuch-1487893991 [https://perma.cc/VCU6-
SBYS] (postulating a “lower-court assault on gun rights”); Charles C.W. Cooke, The Fourth 
Circuit Runs Roughshod Over Heller and the Second Amendment, NAT’L REV. (Feb. 22, 2017, 
2:19 PM), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/445145/fourth-circuit-decision-maryland-
assault-weapons-ban-constitutional-travesty [https://perma.cc/349K-XLAC] (suggesting “the 
Fourth Circuit has taken it upon itself to rewrite Heller”). 
 70. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 780 (2010) (plurality). 
 71. It is, for example, the first line of the en banc dissent in Peruta v. County of San Diego, 
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most prominently, Justice Clarence Thomas has repeatedly suggested 
that the Second Amendment is being subject to second-class treatment: 
he has done so not only in opinions72 and dissents from denials of 
certiorari,73 but in his first questions at oral argument in nearly a 
decade.74 
Dozens of briefs have invoked the same “second class” language, 
often as a means of pressing the Supreme Court to grant cert.75 And as 
one would expect with cert petitions, which typically aim to show more 
than simply the existence of an erroneous decision,76 those briefs have 
often made the broader empirical claim that the error is widely 
replicated.77 A brief filed by dozens of members of Congress is 
 
824 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc): “The Second Amendment is not a ‘second-class’ 
constitutional guarantee.” Id. at 945 (Callahan, J., dissenting). 
 72. Voisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272, 2292 (2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“In 
construing the statute before us expansively so that causing a single minor reckless injury or 
offensive touching can lead someone to lose his right to bear arms forever, the Court continues 
to ‘relegat[e] the Second Amendment to a second-class right.’” (quoting Friedman v. City of 
Highland Park, 136 S. Ct. 447, 450 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari))).  
 73. Silvester v. Becerra, No. 17-342, 2018 WL 943032, at 8* (U.S. Feb. 20, 2018) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“The right to keep and bear arms is apparently this Court’s 
constitutional orphan.”); Peruta v. California, 137 S. Ct. 1995, 1999 (2017) (Thomas, J., dissenting 
from denial of certiorari) (“The Court’s decision to deny certiorari in this case reflects a 
distressing trend: the treatment of the Second Amendment as a disfavored right.”); Friedman, 136 
S. Ct. at 450 (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“I would grant certiorari to prevent 
the Seventh Circuit from relegating the Second Amendment to a second-class right.”). 
 74. Transcript of Oral Argument at 35–39, Voisine, 136 S. Ct. 2272 (No. 14-10154); Josh 
Blackman, Justice Thomas Speaks Truth To Power: Second Amendment Is Not a Second-Class 
Right, JOSH BLACKMAN’S BLOG (Mar. 1, 2016), http://joshblackman.com/blog/2016/03/01/justice-
thomas-speaks-truth-to-power-second-amendment-is-not-a-second-class-right/ 
[https://perma.cc/FCC7-VVNF] (referring to a “rank double standard” and concluding that 
“Thomas’s questions from the bench are meant to illicit [sic] the subjugation of the Second 
Amendment”). 
 75. See, e.g., Brief for National Rifle Association of America as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner at 22, Walker v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2387 (2016) (No. 15-1027) (“The rights 
secured by the Second Amendment are not second-class rights, and this Court should grant 
certiorari to ensure that they are not relegated to that disfavored status.” (citation omitted)); Brief 
for the American Civil Rights Union as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 4, Kachalsky v. 
Cacace, 133 S. Ct. 1806 (2013) (No. 12-845) (“The court below also embraced stepchild, second 
class status for the Second Amendment, contrary to both Heller and McDonald.”). 
 76. SUP. CT. R. 10 (listing factors for certiorari, including existence of a circuit split or 
important question of federal law); id. (“A petition for a writ of certiorari is rarely granted when 
the asserted error consists of erroneous factual findings or the misapplication of a properly stated 
rule of law.”).  
 77. See, e.g., Petitioners’ Reply Brief at 2, Bonidy v. U.S. Postal Serv., 136 S. Ct. 1486 
 (2016) (No. 15-746) (“This Court’s review is further warranted because the deferential form of 
intermediate scrutiny applied by the panel majority below is inconsistent with this Court’s 
precedents regarding how infringements on fundamental rights are analyzed and demonstrates 
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representative: 
  Unfortunately, such second-class treatment of the Second 
Amendment pervades the lower courts. Purported judicial restraint 
in the form of extreme deference to legislative action is flatly at odds 
with Heller, McDonald, and indeed all decisions involving the 
protection of fundamental individual rights against majoritarian 
impulses. The Court must act to ensure that citizens have a means of 
enforcing their individual right to keep and bear arms when legislative 
bodies infringe that right.78 
The suggestion is that resolving the particular case on appeal could 
have far-reaching benefits by addressing an objectionable doctrinal 
trend. 
To be clear, these arguments are not purely empirical. Saying that 
a right is systematically underenforced involves at least two steps: a 
conclusion about how stringently it should be enforced, and an 
assessment of how it actually is enforced in practice. Parties in the gun 
debate disagree about both of these things, but our focus in this Article 
is the latter. In other words, we do not purport to resolve whether 
upholding a federal ban on eighteen- to twenty-year-olds buying 
handguns equates to “second-class” treatment of the Second 
Amendment right.79 Our goal is to help evaluate whether such a 
holding represents any part of a trend. Moreover, we consider other 
objective factors that bear on the question, including those that reflect 
the strength or weakness of a claim and the seriousness with which a 
judge considered it. The end result is a more empirically-grounded 
baseline with which to evaluate claims of underenforcement. 
Of course, any discussion of the proper degree of enforcement will 
always have a normative dimension. Consider, for example, the more 
radical version of the “second class” argument—the suggestion that 
 
how the lower courts are turning the Second Amendment into a second-class right.”); Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari at 12, Jackson v. City of San Francisco, 135 S. Ct. 2799 (2014) (No. 14-704) 
(“[E]ven after this Court’s admonishment that the Second Amendment may not ‘be singled out 
for special—and specially unfavorable—treatment,’ courts continue to do just that. Whether 
through summary reversal or plenary review, this Court should use this opportunity to put an end 
to this disturbing trend.” (citation omitted) (quoting McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 
778–79 (2010))). 
 78. Brief for Members of Congress as Amici Curiae Supporting the Petition for a Writ of 
Certiorari at 4–5, Drake v. Jerejian, 134 S. Ct. 2134 (2014) (No. 13-827). 
 79. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 3, Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. McCraw, 134 S. Ct. 1365 (2014) 
(No. 13-390) (“We urge this Court to grant review in this case both to reaffirm that the Second 
Amendment’s guaranty is not a ‘second-class’ fundamental right and to establish that responsible, 
law-abiding 18-to-20-year-old adults are not second-class citizens.”). 
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lower courts are engaging in a campaign of “massive resistance” to gun 
rights, a phrase made famous by white segregationists opposing school 
integration and now frequently invoked to describe the courts’ 
treatment of the Second Amendment.80 The appropriateness of this 
analogy cannot be evaluated solely by empirics, but depends also on 
one’s belief about how the Second Amendment right should be 
treated.81 
But such characterizations gain strength and relevance from the 
suggestion that they represent a snapshot of broader case law, not least 
because the Court is far more likely to intervene to correct a common 
error than a narrow one. It thus matters when briefs and commentators 
suggest that “lower courts” are “attempting to eradicate the Second 
Amendment.”82 Eventually, those claims find their way to the Justices, 
as in Justices Thomas and Scalia’s dissent from certiorari in Jackson v. 
City of San Francisco, which arose out of the Ninth Circuit: 
  Despite the clarity with which we described the Second 
Amendment’s core protection for the right of self-defense, lower 
courts, including the ones here, have failed to protect it. Because 
Second Amendment rights are no less protected by our Constitution 
 
 80. This claim has been made in briefs, scholarship, and major editorials. See, e.g., Petition 
for Writ of Certiorari at 24, Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 136 S. Ct. 447 (2015) (No. 15-
133); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Jerejian, 134 S. Ct. 2134 (No. 13-827) (describing “lower 
courts’ massive resistance to Heller”); Alice Marie Beard, Resistance by Inferior Courts to 
Supreme Court’s Second Amendment Decisions, 81 TENN. L. REV. 673, 673 (2014) (“In the wake 
of the Supreme Court’s District of Columbia v. Heller (‘Heller I’) and McDonald v. Chicago 
decisions that clarify, expand, and protect Second Amendment rights, federal and state inferior 
courts have been engaging in massive resistance.” (citations omitted)); Editorial, Massive Gun 
Resistance, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 12, 2013, 6:38 PM) https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424 
127887324600704578402760760473582 [https://perma.cc/YQ7N-UJ5E]. Sometimes, comparisons 
are explicitly made between post-Heller developments in gun rights and the struggle for racial 
equality after Brown v. Board of Education. See Alan Gura, The Second Amendment as a Normal 
Right, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 223, 224 (2014); David B. Kopel, Does the Second Amendment 
Protect Firearms Commerce?, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 230, 230 (2014). 
 81. Joseph Blocher, Good Cause Requirements for Carrying Guns in Public, 127 HARV. L. 
REV. F. 218, 218 n.1 (2014) (pointing to the differing political power of contemporary gun owners 
and black schoolchildren in the 1950s).  
 82. Brief for National Rifle Association of America as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners 
for Writ of Certiorari at 16, Friedman, 136 S. Ct. 447 (No. 15-133) (“Rather than perform their 
duty to enforce the Constitution, lower courts are attempting to eradicate the Second 
Amendment by disregarding the Bill of Rights and the precedents of this Court.”); Josh 
Blackman, Justice Thomas: Second Amendment Is Not a ‘Second-Class Right,’ NAT’L REV. (Dec. 
8, 2015, 4:00 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/428173/justice-thomas-second-
amendment-not-second-class-right-josh-blackman [https://perma.cc/DEP4-K9LA] (“By refusing 
to intervene when lower courts disregard the right to keep and bear arms, the Supreme Court has 
done exactly what Chicago wanted, and abdicated this cornerstone of the Bill of Rights.”). 
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than other rights enumerated in that document, I would have granted 
this petition.83 
Whether “lower courts . . . have failed to protect” Heller’s right is 
a foundation of this argument, and empirical study can help determine 
whether that foundation is sound. We can measure the proportion of 
cases in which litigants challenge policies that Heller suggested fell 
outside the bounds of Second Amendment coverage, determine if a 
given court is handling categories of Second Amendment claims 
differently than others, compare appeal rates and success rates to those 
in other areas of litigation, evaluate proxies for whether judges are 
giving serious consideration to Second Amendment claims, and so on. 
Such measures, while not perfect, provide a better basis for broad 
Second Amendment claims than intuition or cherry-picked case law. 
2. Claims About the Content of the Law.  In addition to broad 
characterizations about how cases are being decided, scholars, 
advocates, and even judges have begun to characterize the content of 
the emerging law. Some advocates, taking the same basic tack as the 
“second class” line of argument, suggest that the lower courts are 
“deeply divided” over the applicable standards,84 or that “there is great 
confusion in the lower courts on the meaning of Heller’s ‘presumptively 
lawful regulatory measures.’”85 
Although it may still be true that “[t]he federal judiciary has taken 
only the first steps in developing Second Amendment jurisprudence,”86 
there is wide agreement about what those first steps should be. 
Commentators have, for example, noted that “the most common 
framework is a two-pronged inquiry that first asks whether a 
challenged law imposes a burden on conduct falling within the scope of 
the Second Amendment, and, second, if it does, whether the law 
satisfies the applicable level of scrutiny.”87 Courts, advocates, and 
 
 83. Jackson v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 135 S. Ct. 2799, 2799–2800 (2015) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
 84. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 37, Friedman, 136 S. Ct. 447 (No. 15-133) (“The better 
part of a decade after this Court’s landmark decision in Heller, the lower courts remain deeply 
divided over how to assess Second-Amendment claims, and that confusion poses a serious threat 
to liberty.”). 
 85. Petitioners’ Reply Brief at 3, Bonidy v. U.S. Postal Serv., 136 S. Ct. 1486 (2016) (No. 15-
746). 
 86. Kenneth A. Klukowski, Making Second Amendment Law with First Amendment Rules: 
The Five-Tier Free Speech Framework and Public Forum Doctrine in Second Amendment 
Jurisprudence, 93 NEB. L. REV. 429, 433 (2014). 
 87. LAW CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, supra note 63, at 3. 
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scholars generally agree that some version of the two-part test 
predominates throughout the lower courts.88 
There remains substantial disagreement about how those two 
steps play out in practice. In applying the first step, some courts take a 
deeply historical approach, looking to whether a challenged regulation 
is one of the “presumptively lawful” regulatory measures mentioned in 
Heller,89 or whether “the record includes persuasive historical evidence 
establishing that the regulation at issue imposes prohibitions that fall 
outside the historical scope of the Second Amendment.”90 Some 
commentators, however, have concluded that “originalism has had a 
limited role in post-Heller Second Amendment litigation.”91 
As for the second stage of the two-step test, many scholars and 
advocates agree (some celebrate, while others bemoan) that lower 
courts “have effectively embraced the sort of interest-balancing 
approach that Justice Scalia condemned, adopting an intermediate 
scrutiny test and applying it in a way that is highly deferential to 
legislative determinations and that leads to all but the most drastic 
restrictions on guns being upheld.”92 The alleged permissiveness of this 
second step is of particular concern to litigants challenging gun laws, 
who argue that “[t]he very fact that a court reaches the second step all 
 
 88. See Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives, 700 
F.3d 185, 194 (5th Cir. 2012) (“A two-step inquiry has emerged as the prevailing approach . . . .”); 
see also N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242, 254 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 
136 S. Ct. 2486 (2016) (noting that the two-part test had been largely adopted by the Third, Fourth, 
Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits). 
 89. Jackson v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 960 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 
135 S. Ct. 2799 (2015). 
 90. Id. (citing, with approval, United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1137 (9th Cir. 2013)). 
 91. Lawrence Rosenthal, The Limits of Second Amendment Originalism and the 
Constitutional Case for Gun Control, 92 WASH. U.L. REV. 1187, 1200 (2015) (“The emerging 
consensus in the lower courts uses original meaning only as a threshold test, which screens out 
some claims, but contemplates that laws—even those limiting the extent to which individuals can 
exercise the textually recognized right to keep and bear arms—may be sustained upon sufficient 
justification.”); Eric M. Ruben, Justifying Perceptions in First and Second Amendment Doctrine, 
80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 149, 163 (2017) (“[O]riginalism has not been the primary means of 
deciding cases.”). 
 92. Allen Rostron, Justice Breyer’s Triumph in the Third Battle Over the Second Amendment, 
80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 703, 706–07 (2012); see Brief of Firearms Policy Coalition, Inc. et al. as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 10, Jackson, 135 S. Ct. at 2799 (No. 14-704) (“De Facto 
Interest-Balancing Is Now The Prevailing Rule In The Lower Courts.”); Brief of Members of 
Congress, supra note 78, at 10 (criticizing “the prevailing, nearly automatic application of 
‘intermediate scrutiny’”); see also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 20, District of 
Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008) (No. 07-290) (arguing that, “[l]ike rights conferred by 
surrounding provisions of the Bill of Rights, the individual right guaranteed by the Second 
Amendment is subject to reasonable restrictions and important exceptions”).  
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but guarantees that the challenged law will survive.”93 
For present purposes, what interests us is not the normative 
valence of these claims—for example, that the Second Amendment is 
underprotected, or that the Supreme Court should grant cert again—
but rather their factual predicates: that courts are, in fact, rejecting the 
vast majority of Second Amendment claims, that they are applying 
divergent methodologies, that historical argument is or is not crucial in 
resolving those claims, and so on. 
C. Measuring Doctrine 
Doctrinally, our focus is the Second Amendment. But we hope 
that our efforts also reflect and contribute to broader debates about 
content analysis and rigor in doctrinal scholarship. 
Content analysis of law is not novel. In “Systematic Content 
Analysis of Judicial Opinions,” Mark A. Hall and Ronald F. Wright 
conclude that the practice—albeit not named as such—is decades old 
and, at its best, “brings the rigor of social science to our understanding 
of case law, creating a distinctively legal form of empiricism.”94 Hall 
and Wright review 134 legal content analyses published between 
January 1, 1998 and June 30, 2006, in an effort to “describe past 
practices and to point the way to a better future.”95 They find that such 
studies have evaluated a broad range of legal subject areas, including 
“administrative law, constitutional law, corporate and securities law, 
criminal law and procedure, contracts, employment discrimination, 
health law, and torts.”96 
And yet, despite the frequency with which scholars, lawyers, and 
judges make falsifiable claims about the content of legal doctrine, the 
state of the scholarly art rarely demands more than a “See, e.g.,” signal 
followed by three case citations. As Will Baude, Adam Chilton, and 
Anup Malani note, nearly half of the articles published in one volume 
of the top ten law reviews included a claim about the state of legal 
doctrine in the abstract, but only 25 percent of those articles provided 
 
 93. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 25, Jackson, 135 S. Ct. 2799 (No. 14-704); id. at 20 
(“Time and again, courts have used this open-ended inquiry to constrain the scope of the Second 
Amendment by deeming everything other than the precise conduct at issue in Heller outside its 
‘core.’ And even if laws burden conduct within that core, anything less than a complete ban is 
deemed ‘only a minimal burden.’”). 
 94. Hall & Wright, supra note 17, at 64. 
 95. Id. at 66; see also id. at 70–71 & n.29.  
 96. Id. at 73 (citations omitted). 
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any form of systematic review to support the doctrinal claim.97 Even 
those articles that seek to employ content analysis have yet to develop 
anything like a set of best practices. As a result, Peter Hammer and 
William Sage’s observation likely remains true fifteen years later: this 
is “a confused area of legal scholarship, with few clear norms or 
standards to guide researchers.”98 
It is not hard to imagine why content analysis has not yet played a 
more prominent role in legal scholarship. Case coding does not come 
naturally to doctrinal scholars, and it requires an unfamiliar toolkit. As 
we explain in detail below, even the most cautious and rigorous coding 
project will involve difficult judgment calls and serious caveats. 
Moreover, some scholarly goals are not well suited to the approach. 
But for those that are—including, we think, mapping the content of 
Second Amendment doctrine—the benefits are considerable.99 
Content analysis should generally be distinguished from projects 
that seek to understand judicial behavior. Our focus here is on 
doctrine, not judges, and our goals are not attitudinalist. We therefore 
make no attempt to show whether, for example, judicial votes can be 
explained by judicial ideology.100 
II.  METHODOLOGY 
Our goal was to conduct a comprehensive analysis of post-Heller 
Second Amendment cases. Getting there involved six stages: selecting 
the dataset, constructing the survey, defining key variables, coding the 
 
 97. Baude, Chilton & Malani, supra note 22, at 40; see also Kay L. Levine, The Law Is Not 
the Case: Incorporating Empirical Methods into the Culture of Case Analysis, 17 U. FLA. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 283, 284 (2006) (“Can anyone know the state of the law from reading a handful of 
select cases?”). 
 98. Hammer & Sage, supra note 22, at 560.  
 99. Hall and Wright conclude that content analysis is a powerful way to “identify surface 
patterns” and “verify or refute descriptions of case law that are based on more anecdotal or 
subjective study.” Hall & Wright, supra note 17, at 99–100. 
 100. The attitudinalist project has spawned its own meta-literature of critique, one major fault 
line of which lies between the positive and normative. See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Chemerinsky & 
Jonathan L. Williams, Foreword: Measuring Judges and Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 1173, 1173–74 
(2009) (introducing symposium focused on evaluating and critiquing quantitative measurements 
of judicial behavior). Many critics argue that empirical scholarship about judges should focus on 
what judges do in practice, rather than characterizing them as “political” or not. Michael Boudin, 
A Response to Professor Ramseyer, Predicting Court Outcomes through Political Preferences, 58 
DUKE L.J. 1687, 1688–89 (2009) (cautioning against the use of “political”); David F. Levi, 
Autocrat of the Armchair, 58 DUKE L.J. 1791, 1795, 1795 n.15 (2009) (same); H. Jefferson Powell, 
A Response to Professor Knight, Are Empiricists Asking the Right Questions About Judicial 
Decisionmaking?, 58 DUKE L.J. 1725, 1725–26 (2009) (same). 
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opinions, reviewing for reliability, and analyzing the data.101 This Part 
explains the first five stages, as well as limitations and advantages of 
our methodology. Readers who are primarily interested in the survey 
results and analysis can turn to Parts III and IV. 
A. Data Selection 
Our final dataset includes 997 opinions issued between June 26, 
2008, the date Heller was decided, and February 1, 2016, the date we 
ran our final search. Some litigants challenged more than one law or 
policy in a single case;102 as a result, the 997 opinions address 1,153 
distinct Second Amendment challenges. We analyze the challenges, 
not the opinions as a whole. 
The end date, while selected initially because it happened to be 
the time we were ready to begin work, turns out to correspond almost 
exactly with the period of Second Amendment development between 
Heller and Justice Antonin Scalia’s passing on February 13, 2016. 
Perhaps more than any other constitutional issue, the future of the 
Second Amendment was a flashpoint in the debate over Justice Scalia’s 
replacement.103 After all, Heller has been characterized as Scalia’s 
“legacy,” the “most important [opinion] in his 22 years on the court,” 
and “easily the most significant opinion Scalia has written.”104 But often 
lost in the debate is the fact that, even while Justice Scalia was on the 
bench, the Supreme Court refused to intervene in more than sixty post-
Heller Second Amendment cases, leaving doctrinal development 
primarily to the lower courts. Those courts, in turn, might have been 
 
 101. Substantively, these six stages are the same as the three “components” described by Hall 
and Wright. Hall & Wright, supra note 17, at 79 (“There are three distinct components of content 
analysis: (1) selecting cases; (2) coding cases; and (3) analyzing the case coding, often through 
statistical methods.”). 
 102. To be exact, eighty-four opinions decided more than one Second Amendment challenge. 
 103. The reaction about the future of Second Amendment jurisprudence came almost 
immediately after Justice Scalia’s passing. The very next day, Senator Ted Cruz defended delaying 
the confirmation of the next Justice, noting “[w]e are one justice away from the Second 
Amendment being written out of the constitution altogether.” Matt Flegenheimer, The Death of 
Justice Scalia: Reactions and Analysis, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 14, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
live/supreme-court-justice-antonin-scalia-dies-at-79/cruz-we-are-one-justice-away-from-the-
second-amendment-being-written-out-of-the-constitution/ [https://perma.cc/2S4S-SDXT]. But 
see Joseph Blocher, Scalia’s Gun Rights Legacy Is Likely to Stand, No Matter Who Replaces Him, 
TRACE (Feb. 15, 2016), https://www.thetrace.org/2016/02/antonin-scalia-legacy-gun-rights/ [https: 
//perma.cc/Q3LJ-AYFE]. In any event, President Donald Trump’s election and the confirmation 
of Justice Gorsuch have almost certainly rendered the point moot for the meantime.  
 104. ADAM WINKLER, GUNFIGHT: THE BATTLE OVER THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS IN 
AMERICA 281 (2011) (collecting quotes) (citations omitted). 
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responding in part to Justice Scalia’s presence on the Court.105 
Many empirical studies require, as a practical matter, the selection 
of a subset from a prohibitively large population, which opens the door 
to selection bias.106 Fortunately, the universe of post-Heller opinions 
was small enough to be reviewed in toto, allowing us to avoid that 
problem. 
Nevertheless, we still needed to decide whether to target state or 
federal courts and trial or appellate courts. Analyzing cases from both 
state and federal courts—which no post-Heller review of Second 
Amendment case law has done—enables a comparison of how the two 
systems have handled Second Amendment claims. We thought that 
exercise might be instructive for at least two reasons. First, it would 
allow us to see if federal courts were less receptive to Second 
Amendment challenges than state courts. Second, state courts have 
had more than a century of experience deciding right-to-keep-and-
bear-arms cases under state constitutional amendments, but have 
generally applied a different standard than the two-step test ultimately 
adopted by most federal circuits.107 
We also saw a benefit in reviewing opinions from both trial and 
appellate courts. If our project were solely to count final outcomes, 
reviewing trial court in addition to appellate court decisions would 
unnecessarily double-count some cases. But we also wanted to evaluate 
and compare judicial reasoning. How trial courts explain their Second 
Amendment decisions is relevant to that evaluation. We therefore 
decided to cast the net as broadly as possible, reviewing available 
Second Amendment opinions on Westlaw—both formally published in 
official reporters and not—from every jurisdiction and every tier of the 
court system.108 
 
 105. Stuart Minor Benjamin & Georg Vanberg, Judicial Retirements and the Staying Power of 
U.S. Supreme Court Decisions, 13 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUDS. 5, 5 (2016) (finding that negative 
treatments of Supreme Court opinions increase when Justices who supported the opinions retire). 
 106. Hall & Wright, supra note 17, at 102. 
 107. For a description of the “reasonableness” standard used in most state cases, see generally 
Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second Amendment, 105 MICH. L. REV. 683 (2007). The standard 
applied in post-Heller Second Amendment cases is described supra notes 86–93 and 
accompanying text. 
 108. Westlaw’s “All State Cases” database includes “all available cases from state 
jurisdictions with coverage beginning in 1658.” State Cases Scope Information, WESTLAW 
https://1.next.westlaw.com/Browse/Home/Cases/StateCases?transitionType=Default&contextD
ata=(sc.Default)# (emphasis added). As we explain below, infra note 114 and accompanying text, 
Westlaw contains a spotty collection of state trial court opinions. The Westlaw collection of state 
appellate court opinions is much more comprehensive, though we emphasize that the scope of 
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To isolate those opinions, we conducted a search in Westlaw109: 
advanced: “second amendment” & (arms OR “district #of columbia 
v. heller” OR firearm!) & DA(aft 06-25-2008 & bef 02-02-2016)110 
Our search terms were the result of a process of trial and error that 
sought to capture all of the relevant opinions while omitting false 
positives. For example, the term “second amendment” returned more 
than four thousand opinions, but many of them had nothing to do with 
the Second Amendment.111 Our final search terms returned more than 
2,200 opinions.112 A quick review revealed overbreadth—some 
 
our dataset is constrained by Westlaw’s collection, which in turn was constrained by the universe 
of “available” opinions. Id. For more discussion of limitations of our dataset, see infra note 111 
and Part II.F. 
 109. Some organizations maintain lists of post-Heller Second Amendment opinions. 
However, we chose not to use a premade list to ensure consistency and avoid any semblance of 
bias. We also decided not to use Westlaw’s own coding system. Westlaw tags Second Amendment 
opinions with a unique identifier (“U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 2”), as it does for opinions discussing 
other Amendments. Westlaw also utilizes topic identifiers and “key numbers” suggestive of 
Second Amendment challenges. Our initial review of the cases containing Westlaw’s identifiers, 
however, revealed significant omissions. After consulting with a Westlaw reference attorney, we 
opted to use our own search terms.  
 110. Initially, one required search term was “constitution,” but we subsequently decided that 
term was unduly restrictive, so we reran the search without “constitution.” Because we decided 
to rerun the search after coding was underway, our dataset is separated into two mutually 
exclusive halves: one with opinions containing “constitution!” and the other without that term. 
 111. The words “second amendment” appear in various contexts, including discussions of a 
“second amendment” to a complaint or contract. See, e.g., Oakes v. United Home Life Ins., No. 
3:15cv242-MHT, 2015 WL 5234945, at *1 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 8, 2015) (discussing a “second 
amendment” to complaint); Dollar Tree Stores Inc. v. Toyama Partners LLC, Nos. C 10–0325 SI, 
C 11–2696 SI, 2011 WL 3295420, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2011) (mentioning a “second 
amendment” to contract). Thus, we sought to limit our search by adding additional required 
words. In addition to “second amendment,” most post-Heller Second Amendment cases we 
reviewed also referenced either Heller or the “right to keep and bear arms,” so we added a 
requirement that opinions include either “arms” or “district of columbia v. heller.” When we 
conducted our initial quality review, however, we found a few Second Amendment opinions 
referencing neither term. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Leverone, 31 N.E.3d 1192 (Table), 2015 WL 
3539763 (Mass. App. Ct. June 5, 2015), review denied, 36 N.E.3d 30 (Mass. App. Ct. 2015). Those 
few opinions did, however, include “firearm” or “firearms,” so we added “firearm!” to the search. 
Of course, the Second Amendment is potentially implicated by other types of “arms,” such as 
knives. Since the addition of “firearm!” only captured the odd opinion that did not mention 
“arms” or “district of columbia v. heller,” we were content adding “firearm!” as a search term 
without adding terms for every other type of weapon we could imagine. 
 112. This figure includes cases from two Westlaw databases: the main database of published 
opinions and a separate database of trial court orders. Of course, relying on Westlaw meant that 
we did not include opinions that were not loaded into Westlaw by the time we ran our search. We 
are aware of one opinion, Baker v. Kealoha, No. 1:11-cv-00528-ACK-KSC, 2012 WL 12886818 
(D. Haw. Apr. 30, 2012), vacated, 679 F. App’x. 625 (9th Cir. 2017), which would have been 
returned by our search terms, but was added to the Westlaw database on February 21, 2017. This 
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opinions containing the search terms did not have a Second 
Amendment holding, as we defined it113—but we opted to err on the 
side of inclusiveness rather than risk omitting Second Amendment 
cases. As described below, coders manually removed false positives 
and duplicates. 
Unfortunately, the subset of state trial court opinions was woefully 
incomplete. Most state trial court decisions do not result in published 
opinions that are submitted to Westlaw. As a result, the dataset 
included 441 state appellate court challenges, but just forty-two state 
trial court challenges.114 We therefore decided to omit state trial court 
opinions, resulting in a final dataset of 997 opinions that included 1,153 
Second Amendment challenges. 
B. Survey Construction 
Once we had a dataset, we needed a mechanism to consistently 
code it. To do this, we created a survey that would capture the variables 
we hoped to test.115 Those variables included case caption information 
(for example, judge names, jurisdiction, identity of plaintiff or 
defendant), procedural posture (that is, motion to dismiss, summary 
judgment, and so on), factual information (for example, law being 
challenged), outcome (whether the Second Amendment claim 
failed),116 and aspects of the judicial reasoning justifying the outcome 
(as in reliance on historical analysis or tiered scrutiny). The survey 
contained ninety questions for each challenge in each Second 
Amendment opinion, though some questions are conditioned on 
answers to previous questions. For example, each category of gun 
restriction at issue would prompt certain subquestions. The broad 
range of questions allowed us to gather granular information for each 
case. Moreover, by measuring reliability, we could draw conclusions 
about survey design that hopefully will assist future systematic reviews. 
Some of the questions are designed to be objective proxies for 
potentially subjective concepts. For example, we asked whether the 
 
opinion was not coded and is not part of our analysis. It is possible that other responsive opinions 
were similarly backfilled. 
 113. See infra Part II.C. 
 114. The only state that seems to regularly submit trial court opinions to Westlaw is New 
York, which accounts for twenty-three of the forty-one state trial court opinions we collected. 
 115. A copy of our survey is included as Appendix A, https://dlj.law.duke.edu/wp-
content/uploads/sites/2/2018/04/Ruben-and-Blocher-App.-A.pdf [https://perma.cc/A6DW-
29YL].  
 116. See infra Part II.C. 
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Second Amendment discussion was three or fewer paragraphs—a 
fairly objective measure. If it was, one might fairly say that the analysis 
was conclusory, which is a more subjective concept.117 Similarly, we 
asked whether the court cited historical sources from various time 
periods as a way to measure the degree to which its analysis was 
originalist. But some aspects of a judge’s reasoning necessarily require 
inference on the part of the reader; a judge might, for example, apply 
intermediate scrutiny without expressly saying so. Like anyone relying 
on the text of legal opinions, we are somewhat constrained by what 
courts say they are doing.118 
To avoid inconsistency in the responses to more evaluative 
questions, we engaged in a lengthy process of drafting, testing, and 
revising our questions.119 When we arrived at a near-final survey, we 
tested it by asking three independent coders to code the same ten cases. 
We chose the ten cases to reflect the range of complex opinions we 
believed coders would encounter in the full dataset. We then compared 
results. After making a few adjustments based on our review and 
feedback we received, we were ready to move on to the next steps: 
making some definitional choices, training the coders, and coding the 
dataset.120 
C. Defining Variables 
Any case coding project requires some forethought into how 
variables should be understood by the coders and, later, by the 
 
 117. Other studies have similarly relied on the amount of text devoted to certain legal factors 
as a proxy for those factors’ importance. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Groscup, Steven D. Penrod, 
Christina A. Studebaker & Matthew T. Huss, The Effects of Daubert on the Admissibility of 
Expert Testimony in State and Federal Criminal Cases, 8 PSYCH. PUB. POL’Y & L. 339, 343 (2002). 
 118. The significance of this caveat depends on the degree to which one believes, as Richard 
Posner has put it, that “there is no recognized duty of candor in judicial opinion writing” and that 
judges write opinions that do not track their actual decisional process. Richard Posner, Some 
Realism About Judges: A Reply to Edwards and Livermore, 59 DUKE L.J. 1177, 1182 (2010); see 
also CASS SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 93 (1996) (“Judges may 
write as if they are analogizers, but the analogies are often boilerplate disguising a political 
judgment, rather than a helpful guide to judicial reasoning.”). Our study does not give us any 
definitive insight on this question. But since the text of judicial opinions, not judges’ secret 
motivations, are what are generally thought to constitute precedent, we think that the project has 
significant value even if the Posnerian objection is entirely correct.  
 119. Drafting, testing, and revising the survey took about three months. 
 120. Two questions were added to the survey that required coders to revert and supply 
answers to opinions previously coded. Those questions were (1) “Is the individual plaintiff 
proceeding pro se?” and (2) “Did the court reject the Second Amendment claim on the grounds 
that the Second Amendment did not apply to state or local regulations?” 
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readers.121 Most of our choices were straightforward, but some merit 
explanation. 
At the outset, we needed to define what counts as a “Second 
Amendment holding” and, by extension, which cases should be tagged 
as false positives. The Second Amendment arises in various legal 
contexts, some of which are insufficiently direct to shed much light on 
Second Amendment doctrine. In particular, we excluded two broad 
categories of opinions touching on the Second Amendment: opinions 
that are not decisional and opinions that only incidentally rely on 
Second Amendment law. 
By nondecisional opinions, we mean those that are not controlling. 
For example, we asked about the existence of dissenting and 
concurring opinions because they can serve as a proxy for contentious 
Second Amendment issues, but we excluded content analysis of those 
opinions because they are not controlling.122 Similarly, our dataset does 
not include dissents from denials of certiorari123 or of rehearing in the 
lower courts,124 nor does it include reports and recommendations by 
magistrate judges unless they were subsequently endorsed by the 
district court.125 We also omit opinions that were vacated by the same 
judge or judges who issued a prior opinion, as opposed to being vacated 
on appeal or on rehearing en banc.126 In such cases, only the 
subsequent, controlling opinion filed by the judge or panel is counted. 
Of course, if our goal were an attitudinalist assessment, the content of 
these opinions would be important. But they are less relevant to an 
analysis of actual case outcomes and prevailing doctrine. 
Likewise, we decided not to include cases in which the Second 
 
 121. See, e.g., Samaha & Germano, supra note 58, at 847–60. 
 122. We collected data on these opinions, and may use that data for a future article, but it is 
not part of our analysis here. 
 123. The Supreme Court denied cert to more than sixty petitions in Second Amendment cases 
during the study period, and Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, filed dissents from the 
denial of certiorari in two of those cases. See generally Friedman v. City of Highland Park, Ill., 136 
S. Ct. 447 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Jackson v. City of San Francisco, 135 S. Ct. 2799 (2015) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 124. See, e.g., Moore v. Madigan, 708 F.3d 901, 902–05 (7th Cir. 2013) (Hamilton, J., 
dissenting). 
 125. This choice was intended to avoid duplication at the district court level. In particular, it 
controls for cases in which both the magistrate judge and district judge publish an opinion with 
Second Amendment analysis about the same issue. Compare Dority v. Roy, No. 5:08cv127, 2010 
WL 3257788 (E.D. Tex. 2010) (district court), with Dority v. Roy, No. 5:08cv127, 2010 WL 
3257793 (E.D. Tex. 2010) (magistrate). 
 126. See, e.g., United States v. Chester, 367 F. App’x. 392, 399 (4th Cir. 2010), vacated on reh’g, 
United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 683 (4th Cir. 2010). 
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Amendment analysis was merely incidental to other legal issues. Such 
opinions surely reflect Heller’s impact on the law generally, but their 
Second Amendment discussion was often too tentative to count as a 
Second Amendment holding. Five examples warrant mention. First, 
some opinions include a discussion of the Second Amendment in the 
course of applying the doctrine of constitutional avoidance to avoid 
ruling on the Second Amendment claim.127 Second, other opinions only 
briefly discuss the Second Amendment claim in order to determine 
justiciability, such as whether a plaintiff has standing to challenge a gun 
law.128 Third, opinions deciding whether to grant qualified immunity to 
police officers who have seized a weapon depend in part on whether 
aspects of the Second Amendment right are well established.129 Fourth, 
a similar analysis occurs when a court decides if counsel was ineffective 
for failing to make a Second Amendment argument.130 Finally, when 
an offense is deemed unconstitutional on Second Amendment 
grounds, subsequent opinions may ask whether a conviction for that 
offense can still serve as a predicate for another offense—discussing, in 
the process, the earlier constitutional ruling. This posture was 
particularly common in Illinois after a major part of the state’s public 
carry regime was struck down.131 
These rules eliminated some, but not all, of the challenges that 
arose for coders deciding when to count an opinion for the purposes of 
our survey. Judicial opinions decide Second Amendment questions 
 
 127. United States v. Rehlander, 666 F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 2012), is exemplary. In Rehlander, the 
First Circuit considered whether Maine’s emergency psychiatric admission law triggered 18 
U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) (2012), the ban on firearm possession by a person “committed to a mental 
institution.” Id. at 46. Before Heller, the outcome would have been easy: the First Circuit had 
already held that such admissions triggered § 922(g)(4). But in Rehlander, the court reconsidered 
that conclusion since it now would result in the deprivation of a constitutional right. Rehlander, 
666 F.3d at 48–49. Widespread invocation of constitutional avoidance could conceivably suggest 
that courts perceive—even if they are not directly holding—that the Second Amendment right is 
robust. We do not undertake the analysis necessary to show such a conclusion here.  
 128. See, e.g., Dearth v. Holder, 641 F.3d 499, 501–02 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 129. See, e.g., Baker v. Smiscik, 49 F. Supp. 3d 489, 500–01 (E.D. Mich. 2014).  
 130. See, e.g., Carter v. United States, No. 12–0344–CV–W–ODS, 2012 WL 3230032 (W.D. 
Mo. 2012). 
 131. For a short time, Illinois courts refused to affirm convictions for being an Armed 
Habitual Criminal where a predicate offense was violation of Illinois’s public carry law, which had 
been struck down in People v. Aguilar, 2 N.E.3d 321, 328 (Ill. 2013). See, e.g., People v. Lester, 
No. 1–12–1882, 2014 IL App. (1st) 121882-U (2014). Ultimately, the decisions in Lester and others 
like it were reversed in light of the Illinois Supreme Court decision in People v. McFadden, 61 
N.E.3d 74, 82 (Ill. 2016), that a constitutionally infirm prior felony conviction could be used by 
the government as a predicate felony in a subsequent case. See People v. Lester, No. 1–12–1882 
2017 IL App. (1st) 121882-UB (2017).  
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with varying degrees of definiteness, making it difficult to craft a set of 
rules that would encompass every scenario. Consider the Fourth 
Circuit’s opinion in United States v. Guerrero-Leco.132 Daniel 
Guerrero-Leco argued that a federal statute prohibiting firearm 
possession by certain undocumented immigrants violated his Second 
Amendment rights.133 After his appeal was filed, the Fourth Circuit 
decided United States v. Chester, adopting the two-part test for 
evaluating Second Amendment claims.134 Rather than ruling on the 
merits of Guerrero-Leco’s Second Amendment claim, the Fourth 
Circuit vacated and remanded in a per curiam opinion instructing the 
district court to apply Chester’s two-part analysis.135 
Should the per curiam opinion in Guerrero-Leco be counted as a 
Second Amendment opinion? Reasonable minds could argue both 
sides. For the purposes of our analysis, we decided to include Guerrero-
Leco and others like it, because the Second Amendment is outcome 
determinative, even though that outcome is just vacature and remand. 
Another challenge in defining “Second Amendment holding” was 
how to define whether a Second Amendment claim “succeeds” or 
“fails.” Lee Epstein and Gary King note that there are at least ten 
possible dispositions of cases decided by appellate courts, which 
complicates even this seemingly straightforward task.136 We considered 
counting only final judgments as Second Amendment successes or 
failures, relegating the broad range of interlocutory outcomes to some 
intermediate status. Ultimately, however, we decided on a scheme we 
thought simpler and less error prone. For each opinion, we asked 
whether the court rejected the Second Amendment claim. We count as 
a “success” anything short of rejection. Because we are focused on 
individual challenges within the context of particular cases, this seems 
like the simplest and most straightforward approach: the party that 
raised the Second Amendment claim prevailed at that stage. 
This choice results in a larger number of “successes” than if we 
only counted final rulings, but we think this makes sense. Interlocutory 
rulings, such as the one in Guerrero-Leco, are relevant evidence of 
whether appellate courts are reflexively rejecting Second Amendment 
challenges. Moreover, such judgments can have a powerful effect on 
 
 132. United States v. Guerrero-Leco, 446 F. App’x. 610 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 133. Id. at 610; 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5) (2012). 
 134. Guerrero-Leco, 446 F. App’x. at 610. 
 135. Id. at 611. 
 136. Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 85 tbl.5 (2002). 
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litigation incentives that likewise reflect the potency of the Second 
Amendment right and sometimes lead to ultimate success for a 
challenger—for example, a government motion to dismiss an 
indictment, which would not otherwise be captured in a case coding 
project.137 
But this choice meant that our dataset includes opinions where the 
Second Amendment claim prevailed in a given opinion, but did not 
ultimately succeed at the conclusion of the litigation. After the remand 
in Guerrero-Leco, for example, the Fourth Circuit applied the two-part 
test in a similar case and declared the law at issue in Guerrero-Leco 
constitutional.138 In light of that precedent, on remand the district court 
reimposed Guerrero-Leco’s conviction and sentence.139 Thus, despite 
prevailing at one stage of litigation, Guerrero-Leco’s Second 
Amendment claim ultimately failed. A similar situation sometimes 
arose when courts rejected the government’s motion to dismiss a 
Second Amendment claim, only to later grant the government’s 
motion for summary judgment.140 
One final definitional note concerns categorizing the numerous 
different types of weapon laws. Soon after Heller, Eugene Volokh 
created a helpful and influential categorization scheme.141 We began 
with that scheme and expanded it to generate the taxonomy in 
Appendix B. 142 Some regulations reasonably could fit into more than 
one category. For example, a ban on handgun ownership for anyone 
under twenty-one years of age might be accomplished through a 
registration scheme and thus reasonably could be classified as either a 
 
 137. See, e.g., United States v. Glisson, 460 F. App’x. 259, 263 (4th Cir. 2012) (remanding 
challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2012) for application of two-part test); Motion to Dismiss 
Count Five of Indictment at 1, United States v. Glisson, No. 08-cr-405 (D.S.C. Feb. 27, 2012) 
(government motion to dismiss conviction for violating § 922(g)(9) in “interest of judicial 
economy or the interests of justice”); United States v. Glisson, No. 08-cr-405 (D.S.C. Feb. 28, 
2012) (order granting government’s motion to dismiss conviction for violating § 922(g)(9)). 
 138. See United States v. Carpio-Leon, 701 F.3d 974, 982 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 139. See United States v. Guerrero-Leco, No. 08-CR-00118 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 9, 2014) (order 
entering judgment and sentence). 
 140. Compare Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego, 678 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1061 (S.D. Cal. 2010) 
(denying government’s motion to dismiss claim that permitting scheme violated Second 
Amendment), with Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego, 758 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1121 (S.D. Cal. 2010) 
(granting government’s motion for summary judgment and dismissing claim that permitting 
scheme violated Second Amendment).  
 141. See Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right To Keep and Bear Arms for Self-Defense: 
An Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443, 1475–1545 (2009). 
    142.  See Appendix B, https://dlj.law.duke.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2018/04/Ruben-
and-Blocher-AppB.pdf, [https://perma.cc/Q2SP-U9WN]. 
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“who” ban or a “registration to possess” requirement. In such 
situations, we chose one category (in this case, “Who” ban/”Minors”) 
and made a note in the Appendix. 
D. Coding and Reliability Review 
Once the survey was complete and we defined key variables, we 
carefully trained law student coders at Duke Law School and New 
York University School of Law.143 The decision to rely on student 
coders rather than personally coding each opinion in the first instance 
was not an easy one. Legal scholars have had differing experiences with 
student coders and sometimes opt to code datasets themselves.144 
Author coding, however, tends to involve datasets much smaller than 
ours,145 and it raises its own problems.146 Furthermore, there is good 
reason to believe that law students are capable of accurately coding a 
wide range of variables.147 
Ultimately, we adopted an approach that we believe limits the 
impact of coding errors. Initially, the coders reviewed and coded the 
entire database. When they finished, we conducted a reliability 
review148 and, with the exceptions described below,149 threw out some 
survey questions and report qualified results on others. 
Our reliability review proceeded in two steps. We first asked two 
students to code the same group of Second Amendment opinions 
without informing them that their work was duplicative. We then 
 
 143. Before beginning, each coder read the two most important Supreme Court decisions on 
the Second Amendment, Heller and McDonald. Next, we conducted an orientation with each 
coder, during which we provided an overview of Second Amendment law, explained the survey, 
and fielded questions. During the coding process, we checked in frequently, and responded to 
questions as they arose. The coding process lasted twelve months. 
 144. Hall & Wright, supra note 17, at 110–11. 
 145. Hall and Wright describe as follows:  
85% of case-coding projects [including author- and student-coded projects] used 
universal sampling limited only by year. Of these 114 universal samples, only 11 coded 
more than 1000 cases, and 21 coded from 500 to 1000. Twenty-six of these projects 
coded fewer than 100 cases (with 13 of these fewer than 51), and 39 coded between 100 
and 300. 
Id. at 102. 
 146. See id. at 111 (“From a social science perspective, [researchers coding their own datasets] 
is the height of unmitigated subjectivism—the opposite of good scholarship.”). 
 147. Charles A. Johnson, Content-Analytic Techniques and Judicial Research, 15 AM. POL. Q. 
169, 182–96 (1987). 
 148. According to Hall and Wright, fewer than fifteen percent of systematic reviews include 
statistical testing for intercoder reliability, but we agree that “[g]ood technique” requires 
reliability testing “in some fashion.” See Hall & Wright, supra note 17, at 113. 
 149. See infra notes 160–61 and accompanying text. 
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compared their answers using two statistical measures: percent 
agreement and Cohen’s kappa.150 Neither of these measures is perfect. 
Percent agreement is the most common measure, but does not account 
for chance agreement.151 Kappa adjusts for chance agreement, but does 
so by making assumptions that can themselves be questioned, like 
assuming that coders know, ex ante, the distribution of particular 
answers (which is impossible in a novel study such as ours).152 Unless 
noted, the student-coded data we use received a kappa score of 0.60-
1.00, reflecting substantial to near-perfect agreement.153 
Our second step was to compare the list of opinions in which the 
coders indicated that the Second Amendment claim succeeded with the 
similar list underlying Samaha and Germano’s study, which is 
maintained by the Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence.154 The 
comparison reflected substantial overlap, as expected, but also 
omissions on both lists that reflect different methodological choices. 
The Law Center dataset, for example, was built by searching Lexis 
Nexis for opinions citing Heller, whereas our search was built by 
searching Westlaw for opinions referencing “Second Amendment” 
plus one other relevant term (one such term being “District of 
Columbia v. Heller”).155 Our search therefore missed opinions that did 
not mention “Second Amendment,”156 and the Law Center list missed 
 
 150. See Mary L. McHugh, Interrater Reliability: The Kappa Statistic, 22 BIOCHEMIA MEDICA 
276, 282 (2012) (suggesting that researchers “calculate both percent agreement and kappa” in the 
context of healthcare research projects). We are greatly indebted to Guangya Liu for assisting 
with the statistical analysis necessary for the completion of this project, including determining 
how to judge intercoder reliability. 
 151. Hall & Wright, supra note 17, at 113. 
 152. See McHugh, supra note 150, at 281–82 (concluding that assumptions underlying kappa 
“may lower the estimate of agreement excessively”). 
 153. Id.; Hall & Wright, supra note 17, at 115–16. Cohen’s kappa figures “can range from -1 
to +1, where 0 represents the amount of agreement that can be expected from random chance, 
and 1 represents perfect agreement between the raters.” McHugh, supra note 150, at 279. 
Researchers, including the creator of the measure, Jacob Cohen, have interpreted kappa values 
between 0.21-0.40 as “fair” agreement, 0.41-0.60 as “moderate” agreement, 0.61-0.80 as 
“substantial” agreement, and 0.81-1.00 as “almost perfect” agreement. Id.  
 154. The Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence tracks every opinion on Lexis Nexis that cites 
Heller and codes for the outcome of the Second Amendment claim. The Law Center’s list also 
contains other opinions that Law Center staff come across in the course of their work. The 
spreadsheet is not publicly available, but a 2015 version is on file with the authors.  
 155. See supra text accompanying note 110. 
 156. Two such opinions are Welsch v. Twp. of Upper Darby, No. 07-4578, 2008 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 65500 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 26, 2008) and In re Weapons of A.S., No. A-3192-10T4, 2012 N.J. 
Super. Unpub. LEXIS 256 (App. Div. Feb. 6, 2012). 
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opinions that did not cite Heller.157 Moreover, the Law Center dataset 
picks up opinions that did not include a Second Amendment holding 
under our definition.158 As a result of our comparison, seven opinions 
were recoded to indicate that a Second Amendment challenge 
prevailed. For the most part, these seven opinions reflected the 
definitional challenge of defining success: six of the seven contained 
either a split decision or an otherwise ambiguous Second Amendment 
victory.159  
At the end of this process, we knew which questions returned 
more or less consistent results and qualified our conclusions 
accordingly.160 In two places we decided to code responses ourselves. 
First, intercoder agreement naturally drops as the quantity of possible 
answers increases,161 and the large number of subcategories in our 
initial taxonomy (fifty-eight) exceeded whatever number could lead to 
consistent student coding. Moreover, laws often do not fit neatly into a 
single category, which further undermines consistency. For example, 
weapons bans are often implemented through registration laws and 
were thus classified by the student coders inconsistently, yet correctly, 
as either a “weapon ban” or “registration law.” These questions called 
for a different approach. Accordingly, we refined our categorization 
scheme, attached here as Appendix B, and author-coded according to 
 
 157. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Leverone, No. 14-P-400, 2015 WL 3539763 (Mass. App. Ct. 
June 5, 2015).  
 158. See supra notes 127–31 and accompanying text. 
 159. Those six opinions were: Baker v. Holder, No. 11-55067, 2012 WL 3044165, at *1–2 (9th 
Cir. July 25, 2012) (affirming dismissal on standing grounds, but reversing dismissal on FED. R. 
CIV. P. 12(b)(6) grounds and remanding with leave to amend complaint); Rhein v. Pryor, No. 13-
C-843, 2014 WL 1099157, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 20, 2014) (granting motion to dismiss official 
capacity claim, but rejecting motion to dismiss individual capacity claim); Plouffe v. Town of 
Dighton, 984 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4–5 (D. Mass. 2013) (denying motion to dismiss challenge to 
discretionary denial of gun permit in one-sentence order, but after longer discussion of various 
claims that “could not creditably” succeed); Fisher v. Kealoha, 869 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1209–25 (D. 
Haw. 2012) (dismissing claims against city, unnamed individual defendants, and named individual 
defendant, but denying motion to dismiss claim against individual defendant for injunctive relief); 
People v. Bell, 2014 IL App (1st) 120314-U, at *4–5 (Ill. App. Ct. June 11, 2014) (affirming denial 
of motion to dismiss for one count, but reversing for two others in light of People v. Aguilar); 
People v. Campbell, 2 N.E.3d 1249, 1250–53 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013) (reversing one conviction on 
Second Amendment grounds, but remanding to enter a judgment of conviction and sentence for 
a separate, constitutional part of the statutory scheme). One case presented a clearer Second 
Amendment success. See Wilson v. Cty. of Cook, 968 N.E.2d 641, 654–58 (Ill. 2012) (remanding 
challenge to assault weapon ban for further factfinding). 
 160. See infra Part III.B (noting tentativeness of conclusions based on coding of doctrinal 
questions, for which intercoder reliability measures were lower).  
 161. Hall & Wright, supra note 17, at 113. 
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that scheme. 
Second, we wanted to analyze the entire range of questions with a 
particularly high degree of reliability for those cases in which the 
Second Amendment claim succeeded. Thus, instead of making 
tentative conclusions for this group of opinions, we recoded them 
ourselves. For clarity, we separate the analysis of these author-coded 
opinions in Part IV. 
Even with these precautions and checks, our results inevitably 
include some errors. This is unavoidable for a large-scale project such 
as ours. Given the number of challenges we coded and the number of 
questions asked about each one, the dataset involved roughly 100,000 
data entry points, any one of which could be subject to a typo or other 
error. That same size, however, provides some assurance that such 
errors—so long as they are not systematic—will not dramatically 
impact the conclusions. 
E. Caveats and Lessons 
All systematic reviews have their limitations and advantages, and 
ours is no exception.162 The subject, scope, and nature of our study 
raises a few particular caveats and lessons worth emphasizing. 
Ambiguities and judgment calls are unavoidable. Our project 
confirms that coding cases inevitably involves difficult and contestable 
judgment calls.163 Many prior debates about the difficulty of coding 
cases have focused on the appropriateness or accuracy of calling 
particular outcomes “liberal” or “conservative,” or on how to classify 
case results.164 We do not attempt the former, but faced plenty of 
challenges with regard to the latter. 
As noted above, it was difficult at times to determine whether a 
case even had a Second Amendment holding165 or whether the Second 
 
 162. Edwards & Livermore, supra note 20, at 1966 (“In order for empirical scholarship to 
serve its highest function, it is of the utmost importance that scholars in this field acknowledge 
the limits of their research and maintain an appropriate level of modesty in their claims.”). 
 163. Hall & Wright state as follows:  
It is inevitable that some measure of ambiguity will remain in how coding categories 
should apply to particular cases. Often, there is no obvious right way to resolve these 
judgment calls but such ambiguity is not disabling as long as coders are reasonably 
consistent in how they apply coding categories across a range of cases. 
Hall & Wright, supra note 17, at 109.  
 164. See, e.g., Andreas Broscheid, Comparing Circuits: Are Some U.S. Courts of Appeals More 
Liberal or Conservative Than Others?, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 171, 175 (2011). 
 165. See supra notes 132–35 and accompanying text. 
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Amendment claim prevailed.166 Consistently placing gun laws into one 
of fifty-eight oft-overlapping subcategories was also understandably 
challenging, and called for an approach other than student coding.167 
Similar challenges arose for many of the other issues that we attempted 
to code. 
These are unavoidable challenges for empirical projects168 and we 
do not think that ours faces them in any unique way. There are, 
moreover, standard responses. One is to reiterate the disclaimer that 
our study—like all empirical studies—does not eliminate discretion, 
disagreement, and outright error.169 We have attempted to minimize 
these issues to the degree possible by carefully defining key variables 
and conducting a reliability review that helps confirm both the 
accuracy and consistency of our results. 
Treating all cases equally does not account for the significance of 
appellate precedent. Coding a large number of cases from various tiers 
of the court system cannot fully capture the potentially relevant and 
important differences among them. Circuit opinions bind trial courts 
within the circuit and therefore generally have greater impact. Even 
within court systems, some decisions have more weight than others.170 
Because systematic analyses treat every opinion as an equal unit of 
measurement, they cannot perfectly capture the hierarchical nature of 
American jurisprudence. Of course, we can and do analyze district and 
appellate opinions separately as well as together. Some of our 
questions are also intended to be rough approximations of the 
authoritativeness of an opinion,171 but they are only approximations. 
 
 166. See supra notes 136–40 and accompanying text. 
 167. See supra note 161 and accompanying text. 
 168. See, e.g., Epstein & King, supra note 136, at 74–76 (discussing conceptual difficulties in 
empirical projects and the importance of “develop[ing] working definitions that minimize loss 
from concept to definition”). 
 169. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Rational Judicial Behavior: A Statistical Study 
3 (Univ. of Chi. L. & Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 404, 2008), https://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1126403 [https://perma.cc/FUD6-U2RZ] (finding “a high error 
rate” in parts of the Songer court of appeals database commonly used by empirical legal scholars); 
Reed C. Lawlor, Fact Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions, 8 JURIMETRICS J. 107, 124 (1968) 
(noting a mix of simple errors, inherent ambiguities and other issues leading to coding 
disagreement, and the near-impossibility of eliminating all such disagreement). 
 170. See Thomas A. Smith, The Web of Law, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 309, 325 (2007) (“[T]he 
concentration of legal authority (at least as measured by citation frequency) [is] in only a relative 
few cases . . . .”). 
 171. For example, we ask whether a court concluded that the case was governed by existing 
precedent. Moreover, we ask whether a Second Amendment discussion is three paragraphs or 
less, which is a rough approximation for whether an opinion contains the rigorous analysis one 
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Precedent is hard to measure or even to define. Unlike most prior 
empirical work, we have attempted to code not just case outcomes but 
case content—and, in particular, to investigate the impact of Heller. 
Doing so yields valuable information about the state of Second 
Amendment law and many of the legal factors that seem to be driving 
it, while facing the same practical challenges as any other empirical 
effort to measure precedent.172 But it also helps illustrate and 
potentially sharpen questions about the nature of precedent and legal 
reasoning.173 
The simple view of precedent is that it refers to situations in which 
a case is governed by a prior case or rule, in the sense that its result is 
compelled by the result in a prior case regardless of the 
decisionmaker’s agreement with the prior case.174 But that depends on 
a question of causation that is just as fundamentally open textured (and 
perhaps even normative) as those that arise in other areas of law. Our 
dataset included a wide range of illustrative examples. It is clear that 
Guerrero-Leco would not have been decided the way it was had it not 
been for Heller. And yet it is still debatable whether it is a Second 
Amendment case.175 
Such jurisprudential questions do not have to be answered in 
order to perform empirical analysis. One can measure the influence of 
precedent by asking about express reliance on it or by using proxies for 
 
would expect from an influential opinion. See supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
 172. FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 202 (2007) 
(“The close study of precedents and their impact [on appellate decisionmaking] is impossible with 
currently available or readily foreseeable empirical tools.”). Some notable attempts have 
nonetheless been made. See generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: 
A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 19 J.L. & ECON. 249 (1976) (studying age of typical citations 
to precedents from the Supreme Court and lower courts). 
 173. Stefanie A. Lindquist & Frank B. Cross, Empirically Testing Dworkin’s Chain Novel 
Theory: Studying the Path of Precedent, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1156, 1157 (2005) (“Perhaps the most 
important, yet understudied, area of legal research involves precedent.”); Adam M. Samaha, 
Looking Forward Over a Crowd—Do More Interpretive Sources Mean More Discretion?, 92 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 554, 593–99 (2017) (discussing “competing predictions about the effects of 
precedent accumulation on judicial discretion” and challenging earlier findings that as precedent 
mounts, judicial discretion increases). 
 174. Fredrick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 575–76 (1987); see also Larry 
Alexander, Constrained by Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 59 (1989) (“[I]f incorrectness were a 
sufficient condition for overruling, there would be no precedential constraint in statutory and 
constitutional cases.”); Michael J. Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional 
Decisionmaking and Theory, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 68, 73 (1991) (supporting “the traditional 
view that precedents should be overruled only when the prior decision was wrongly decided and 
there is some other important disadvantage in respecting that precedent”) (emphasis in original). 
 175. See supra notes 132–35 and accompanying text. 
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it, both of which are strategies that we have utilized here. But these 
measurements likely over- or understate a precedent’s influence—the 
former because express reliance may not mean much, and the latter 
because once a leading case becomes “domesticated” by circuit 
precedent (as is increasingly true of Heller), analysis could become 
more concise even though the influence is just as strong. 
Judicial language might not reflect judicial reasoning. Another 
limitation is inherent in our objective of identifying trends by 
quantifying repetitive aspects of judicial reasoning. In particular, what 
judges say they are doing in their opinions might not always be an 
accurate indicator of what they are “really” doing.176 Express reasoning 
may simply be a judge’s effort to justify his or her desired end. 
This caveat, however, is not unique to systematic content analysis. 
All doctrinal analysis relies heavily on express judicial reasoning. The 
alternative would be to take the attitudinalist approach and focus on 
judges’ perceived politics. But that approach faces challenges of its 
own,177 and in any event should probably begin with an analysis of what 
judges actually say they are doing. Moreover, we also find comfort in 
Samaha and Germano’s conclusion that judicial ideology plays a 
relatively small role, if any at all, in Second Amendment cases.178 
The importance of procedural posture significantly complicates the 
analysis. Litigants face differing burdens depending on the posture of 
a case. For example, a plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction against 
a gun regulation would have to show that “he is likely to succeed on 
the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of 
preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that 
an injunction is in the public interest.”179 A criminal defendant raising 
a Second Amendment defense would simply have to convince a court 
of his claim. 
We have not coded for these burdens systematically. But we have 
 
 176. Sanford Levinson, Why Didn’t the Supreme Court Take My Advice in the Heller Case? 
Some Speculative Responses to an Egocentric Question, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1491, 1497 (2009) (“For 
many, especially political scientists, the best explanation for the kind of differences observed in 
Heller (and, of course, many other cases) is that legal arguments per se are relatively weak 
explanations for judicial votes.”); see also SUNSTEIN, supra note 118, at 191–96 (summarizing 
range of considerations and pressures that can underlie judicial reasoning); Posner, supra note 
118, at 1182 (arguing that judicial opinions may be written in a legalistic style because that is most 
familiar to law clerks or may be politically useful, but that judicial decisionmaking itself is far less 
constrained by precedent or legalistic thinking). 
 177. See supra note 100. 
 178. See Samaha & Germano, supra note 58, at 861. 
 179. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). 
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no reason to think that such burdens would look any different in 
Second Amendment cases than in other sets of cases. And we did code 
for the procedural postures of the cases, which allows us to compare 
success rates on different types of motions. 
Out-of-court resolutions are not considered. Finally, our dataset is 
comprised of judicial opinions, and therefore does not directly account 
for the effect of out-of-court resolutions. If a municipality adjusts a gun 
policy after an adverse ruling in trial court, for example, then there will 
be no appellate litigation on point.180 This would distort comparisons 
between trial and appellate court successes.181 
Likewise, if a municipality preemptively rescinds or decides not to 
adopt a policy based on Second Amendment concerns, or if civil 
litigants settle Second Amendment claims out of court, or if criminal 
defendants receive favorable plea agreements on the basis of a Second 
Amendment claim, those outcomes are not counted in our dataset.182 
How Heller has affected decisionmaking outside of the courtroom is 
more difficult to measure, and we do not attempt to do so 
systematically in this study. 
III.  THE STATE OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT: EMPIRICAL 
FINDINGS 
This Part summarizes our empirical findings. First, we report 
characteristics of Second Amendment challenges subject to litigation 
and evaluate how those characteristics correlate with success. Second, 
we quantify doctrinal trends that are guiding the lower courts in Second 
Amendment cases. 
 
 180. See, e.g., Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 655 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (noting that, 
after district court struck down the District of Columbia’s public carry ban in Palmer v. District of 
Columbia, 59 F. Supp. 3d 173 (D.D.C. 2014), the D.C. Council opted to amend its code rather 
than appeal the adverse decision); Veasey v. Wilkins, No. 5:14-CV-369-BO, 2015 WL 7776557, at 
*1 (E.D.N.C. Dec. 2, 2015) (noting that after district court granted preliminary injunction against 
North Carolina’s requirement that a person demonstrate American citizenship prior to obtaining 
a concealed carry permit in Veasey v. Wilkins, No. 5:14–CV–369–BO, 2015 WL 1884832 (E.D.N.C. 
Apr. 24, 2015), North Carolina removed the requirement). 
 181. On the other hand, this circumstance reflects an argument in favor of including district 
court opinions in the dataset. If we limited ourselves to appellate courts, such litigation victories 
would not be captured at all. See supra note 137 and accompanying text. 
 182. See, e.g., Brief for the Villages of Winnetka and Skokie, Illinois, the City of Evanston, 
Illinois, the Illinois Municipal League, & the International Municipal Lawyers Ass’n as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Respondents at 15, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (No. 
08-1521) (“Winnetka and Evanston[, Illinois] repealed longstanding handgun laws to avoid costly 
litigation brought by respondent NRA and others.”). 
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Our primary goal is to give a descriptive account of the doctrine, 
and not to test particular hypotheses, let alone make normative 
assessments of the results or the law. We present our results in the form 
of contingency tables (also known as cross-tabulations or crosstabs), a 
common means of displaying frequency counts. 
We think that this straightforward approach is the best way to 
present the kind of generalized, foundational information we hope to 
provide. Considering the lack of any large-scale quantitative study of 
post-Heller Second Amendment doctrine, straightforward information 
like the success rate of challenges in criminal cases—with the two 
variables being success and criminal case—is a necessary starting point. 
Simply knowing when two variables appear to intersect can help frame 
questions about why or how they do so—the kinds of questions we 
address in our regression analysis in Part IV.C—but, again, our primary 
goal is simply to report the results. 
A. Characterizing Second Amendment Challenges 
Consistent with the common wisdom, the vast majority of Second 
Amendment claims fail. Of the 1,153 Second Amendment challenges 
in the database, only 108 were not rejected, for an overall success rate 
of 9 percent.183 This subpart breaks down these figures. 
1. Where Is the Second Amendment Action?  We coded whether a 
challenge was brought in federal appellate, federal trial, or state 
appellate court. We also collected more granular data on specific 
jurisdictions. 
a. State or Federal, Trial or Appellate.  Naturally, there is more 
Second Amendment litigation in federal trial courts (491 challenges) 
than in federal appellate courts (221 challenges). This reflects, in part, 
logical attrition: not all litigants appeal adverse decisions. Notably, 
however, our numbers suggest that the appeal rate is higher in Second 
Amendment cases than in many other areas of law. Ted Eisenberg 
found that, in general, 19 percent of nontried civil cases resulting in a 
definitive judgment are appealed.184 Based on the raw numbers in our 
 
 183. This success rate is higher than recorded by the Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence, 
which reports that ninety-six percent of claims fail. LAW CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, 
supra note 63, at 6. Methodological differences could easily account for the variance. See supra 
notes 154–58 and accompanying text. Throughout this discussion, we round percentiles to the 
nearest whole number. 
 184. Theodore Eisenberg, Appeal Rates and Outcomes in Tried and Nontried Cases: Further 
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dataset, it appears that as many as 28 percent of federal trial court civil 
decisions involving the Second Amendment are appealed. The number 
may even be higher, since some trial opinions had yet to result in an 
appellate opinion when we conducted our search.185 
The majority of Second Amendment litigation, however, has been 
in the state courts. Our dataset includes 441 challenges decided by state 
appellate courts, compared to 221 by federal appellate courts. This 
disparity, though not surprising, is significant, since post-Heller 
scholarship has focused almost exclusively on the federal courts.186 On 
the whole, Second Amendment claims have succeeded most frequently 
in federal appellate courts (13 percent), compared to federal trial 
courts (8 percent) and state appellate courts (9 percent): 














38 29 41 108 
8% 13% 9% 9% 
Total 
Challenges 
491 221 441 1153 
Across all groups, p < 0.10; Federal Trial vs. Federal Appellate, p < 0.025.187 
 
Exploration of Anti-Plaintiff Appellate Outcomes, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 659, 660 (2004). 
 185. Explaining these numbers is beyond the scope of the project, and would likely require a 
different set of tools. Perhaps Second Amendment litigants are strongly motivated or certain of 
the merits of their cases, and thus more willing than other litigants to pursue their claims on 
appeal. Or perhaps actual or perceived uncertainty in the doctrine produces more appeals, 
because arguments are not clearly understood to be weak. Because we do not have a comparable 
dataset of state trial court decisions, we cannot conduct this analysis for state litigation. 
 186. See supra notes 44–61 and accompanying text. 
 187. We report probability values, or p-values, to reflect the statistical significance of our 
results. P-values are calculated using statistical tests that differ depending on the inference being 
drawn. For Tables 1–7, which test whether there is a relationship between categorical variables 
and success (like court system and success), p-values are calculated using the chi-square statistic. 
See DAVID KREMELBERG, PRACTICAL STATISTICS: A QUICK AND EASY GUIDE TO IBM SPSS 
STATISTICS, STAT, AND OTHER STATISTICAL SOFTWARE 120, 124–29 (2010) (describing the chi-
square statistic and how it is appropriate for categorical comparisons). For Tables 8–16, which 
test changes over time (like success rates by year), p-values are calculated using Pearson’s 
correlation coefficient, or Pearson’s r. See id. at 120–24 (describing Pearson’s correlation 
coefficient and how it is appropriate for relationships over time). These statistics function by 
testing the “null hypothesis” that two variables are independent and that chance alone resulted 
in any correlation. See James J. Brudney, A Famous Victory: Collective Bargaining Protections 
and the Statutory Aging Process, 74 N.C. L. REV. 939, 972 n.100 (1996) (describing p-values in the 
context of the chi-square statistic). A commonly accepted threshold for statistical significance is 
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The fact that Second Amendment appeals lose at a high rate is not 
news to those who follow Second Amendment litigation. Until now, 
though, no study has shown an above-average appeal rate in these 
cases. The two trends are likely intertwined, perhaps due to uncertainty 
in the doctrine (whether real or perceived), strongly motivated or 
overconfident litigants, or some other reason hard to pin down with 
our data.188 Whatever the reason, the high rate of appeal for failed 
claims further inflates the overall failure rate. Below we add another 
layer, discussing data pointing to the relative weakness of a large 
proportion of Second Amendment claims. 
b. Regional Variation.  Second Amendment litigation is not 
distributed evenly. In the federal courts of appeals, two courts account 
for roughly one-third of 219 challenges189: the Fourth Circuit (thirty-six 
challenges) and Ninth Circuit (thirty-one challenges). 
Two potential explanations for this distribution are circuit sizes 
and regional differences in gun control regimes. The Ninth Circuit is 
the largest in the country, handling more appeals than any other 
circuit.190 But that alone cannot explain the variance in Second 
Amendment caseloads. The Fourth Circuit has a much smaller overall 
caseload than the Ninth,191 but hears a similarly high number of Second 
Amendment challenges. Another factor is the presence of gun-control-
friendly states within these circuits. California (Ninth Circuit) and 
 
p < 0.05. Id. (collecting sources). We separate p-values into six ranges: p < 0.001, p < 0.01, p < 
0.025, p < 0.05, p < 0.10, and p > 0.10. We do not include p-values for Tables 17–24, which simply 
report the characteristics of successful challenges. 
 188. As noted above, supra notes 180–82 and accompanying text, our analysis does not take 
into account settlements, and we make no claims about the impact of settlement rates across 
different types of litigation. 
 189. Two federal appellate decisions are excluded from this regional analysis: McDonald v. 
City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) and United States v. Cooper, No. ACM 38307, 2014 WL 
4894599 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Sept. 24, 2014).  
 190. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES 
COURTS: ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR tbl.B-7 (2016) (showing relative caseloads of 
different circuits). Relative caseload can also explain why sixteen Second Amendment opinions 
were published in the Fifth Circuit, despite the fact that every state in the Fifth Circuit received 
an “F” rating by the Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence—an indication of lax gun laws. See id. 
(6,359 cases commenced in Fifth Circuit in the twelve months ending March 31, 2015, reflecting 
second largest docket among circuits); 2016 Gun Law State Scorecard, LAW CTR. PREVENT GUN 
VIOLENCE, http://gunlawscorecard.org/ [https://perma.cc/9XX3-4R8G] (showing “F” rating for 
Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas). 
 191. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 190, at tbl.B-7 (7,134 cases commenced 
in the Ninth Circuit and 3,769 commenced in the Fourth Circuit during the twelve months ending 
March 31, 2015).  
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Maryland (Fourth Circuit) are known to have some of the strongest 
gun laws in the country, which in turn makes them target-rich 
environments for Second Amendment claims. But again, this is only a 
partial explanation. Far fewer Second Amendment challenges were 
heard in the Second Circuit (eleven challenges), which has a case load 
similar to the Fourth192 and is home to two states associated with strong 
gun laws, New York and Connecticut. Differences exist between the 
dockets and priorities of the various circuits in other areas of 
substantive law, which may help explain their differing rates of Second  
Amendment litigation.193 
Second Amendment claims have had relatively high success rates 
in the courts that have been criticized as giving the Second Amendment 
right second-class treatment.194 Overall, claims have succeeded most 
frequently—both in absolute terms and proportionally—in the Second, 
Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits. Indeed, with the exception 
of one case in the Sixth Circuit, these are the only circuits that have 
upheld a Second Amendment challenge. As we note, these are the 
circuits with the strongest gun laws and, thus, the best litigation targets. 
Likely for that reason, they also have been a primary focus for impact 
litigation efforts by sophisticated gun rights advocates. 




 192. Id. (3,676 cases commenced in the Second Circuit during the twelve months ending 
March 31, 2015). 
 193. See Marin K. Levy, The Mechanics of Federal Appeals: Uniformity and Case Management 
in the Circuit Courts, 61 DUKE L.J. 315, 366–75 (2011). 
 194. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 








First 0 0% 7 Seventh 3 16% 19 
Second 2 18% 11 Eighth 0 0% 23 
Third 0 0% 12 Ninth 4 13% 31 
Fourth 4 11% 36 Tenth 0 0% 15 
Fifth 0 0% 15 Eleventh 0 0% 17 
Sixth 1 9% 11 D.C. 14 64% 22 
    
Total 28 13% 219 
    p < 0.001    
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In state courts as well, the bulk of Second Amendment litigation 
has occurred in geographic areas known to have stronger gun 
regulations.195 Of 438 state appellate challenges in the database,196 66 
percent are from Illinois (167), California (59), Massachusetts (36), and 
New Jersey (26). Of these four states, only appellate courts in Illinois 
have granted Second Amendment relief. Those litigation rates are 
dramatically different than in states thought to be more gun friendly. 
For example, appellate courts in the twenty-five states that have 
received an “F” rating from the Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence 
for their gun laws197 heard thirty-one Second Amendment challenges 
and rejected all of them. We cannot show causation, but it is not hard 
to imagine why states with less gun regulation would spawn fewer 
complaints about gun laws and be less attractive to impact litigators. 
(This despite the fact that voters who do not push legislatures to pass 
stringent gun laws are also likely to elect gun-friendly judges). Second 
Amendment litigants simply are not bringing cases in those states, 
perhaps because they lack targets. 
The large number of challenges and successes in Illinois can be 
explained by a feature of Illinois’s former scheme for regulating public 
carry. Before 2013, it was illegal for a person to carry a firearm 
“uncased, loaded and immediately accessible.”198 In People v. 
Aguilar199 and People v. Burns,200 the Illinois Supreme Court struck 
down this scheme as violating the Second Amendment. As a result, 
dozens of criminal convictions were challenged and vacated, producing 
numerous opinions on Westlaw. The summary chart of successes by 
state is below: 
 
 195. Our data alone cannot cast light on another significant issue: the degree to which, after 
Heller, the Second Amendment has replaced state constitutional analogues as the basis for gun 
rights challenges in state courts.  
 196. This number and the following analysis exclude three challenges from the Virgin Islands. 
See Nicholas v. People of the Virgin Islands, 56 V.I. 718, 750–52 (2012) (one challenge); Virgin 
Islands v. James, 54 V.I. 45, 47 (2010) (two challenges). 
 197. See 2016 Gun Law State Scorecard, supra note 190 (listing Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, 
Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Mississippi, Missouri, 
Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, 
Texas, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming as having an “F” score). 
 198. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/24–1.6(a)(3)(A) (West 2008). 
 199. People v. Aguilar, 2 N.E.3d 321 (Ill. 2013), modified, People v. Burns, 79 N.E.3d 159 (Ill. 
2015). 
 200. People v. Burns, 79 N.E.3d 159 (Ill. 2015). 
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Table 3: Success Rates in State Appellate Cases 
2. Who Is Bringing Second Amendment Challenges?  We collected 











AL 0 0% 0 MT 0 0% 0 
AK 0 0% 7 NE 0 0% 0 
AZ 0 0% 3 MV 0 0% 1 
AR 0 0% 0 NH 0 0% 0 
CA 0 0% 59 NJ 0 0% 26 
CO 0 0% 1 NM 0 0% 0 
CT 2 40% 5 NY 0 0% 9 
DE 0 0% 0 NC 1 33% 3 
DC 5 14% 35 ND 0 0% 0 
FL 0 0% 3 OH 2 13% 16 
GA 0 0% 1 OK 0 0% 0 
HI 0 0% 1 OR 0 0% 2 
ID 0 0% 1 PA 0 0% 7 
IL 28 17% 167 RI 0 0% 0 
IN 0 0% 1 SC 0 0% 0 
IA 0 0% 1 SD 0 0% 0 
KS 0 0% 3 TN 0 0% 1 
KY 0 0% 0 TX 0 0% 1 
LA 0 0% 8 UT 0 0% 0 
ME 0 0% 0 VT 0 0% 1 
MD 0 0% 4 VA 0 0% 1 
MA 0 0% 36 WA 0 0% 8 
MI 2 18% 11 WV 0 0% 0 
MN 0 0% 7 WI 1 17% 6 
MS 0 0% 1 WY 0 0% 0 
MO 0 0% 1 Total 41 9% 438 
p > 0.10 
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Amendment challenges. Here, we use that data to compare civil 
plaintiffs and criminal defendants, pro se and represented plaintiffs, 
and individual and organizational plaintiffs. 
a. Criminal or Civil.  Sixty-four percent of the challenges in the 
database were initiated by criminal defendants, with significant 
variations between court systems: 45 percent of federal trial challenges, 
66 percent of federal appellate challenges, and 85 percent of state 
appellate challenges. The defendants in these cases succeeded in just 6 
percent of their challenges, though with meaningful distinctions 
between federal trial court (0.5 percent), federal appellate court (4 
percent), and state appellate court (10 percent). The latter figure is a 
function of the Aguilar litigation in Illinois, as described above.201 If we 
omit Illinois criminal cases, the state appellate court success rate drops 
to 6 percent, more in line with the rate in federal appellate court. 
Litigants fared considerably better in civil cases. About 36 percent 
of the database involved civil claims, again with variance between court 
systems: civil challenges accounted for 55 percent of federal trial 
challenges, 34 percent of federal appellate challenges, and 15 percent 
of state appellate challenges. Overall, civil litigants succeeded in 15 
percent of challenges, though that rate jumped to 30 percent in federal 
appellate court. 

















Civil 37/269 14% 23/76 30% 2/66 3% 62/411 15% 
Criminal 1/222 0% 6/145 4% 39/375 10% 46/742 6% 
Total 38/491 8% 29/221 13% 41/441 9% 108/1153 9% 
 
p < 0.001 p < 0.001 p < 0.10 p < 0.001 
 
b. Pro Se or Represented.  Within the subset of civil cases, the 
success rate varied considerably depending on whether a plaintiff was 
represented by counsel (21 percent) or not (2 percent).202 The impact 
 
 201. See supra notes 198–200 and accompanying text. 
 202. This calculation excludes eight challenges in which it was not clear whether a plaintiff 
was represented and one challenge involving only an organizational plaintiff for which the 
representation question was not asked. 
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of representation was most apparent at the federal appellate level, 
where represented parties succeeded 40 percent of the time. Federal 
appellate courts rejected all of the Second Amendment claims brought 
by pro se litigants. 
Our data cannot explain why pro se litigants are particularly 
unsuccessful—for example, whether they are disadvantaged by a lack 
of formal legal training or simply select weaker cases. Whatever the 
reason, self-representation closely correlates with failure in Second 
Amendment litigation. 



















Pro Se 3/98 3% 0/17 0% 0/11 0% 3/126 2% 
Represented 34/166 20% 23/58 40% 2/52 4% 59/276 21% 
  p < 0.001 p < 0.01 p > 0.10 p < 0.001 
 
c. Individual or Organizational.  The existence of an 
organizational plaintiff, meanwhile, correlated with more success at the 
federal trial level, but not at the federal appellate level. In federal trial 
court, cases brought by an organizational plaintiff were successful 29 
percent of the time, compared to 9 percent for individual plaintiffs.203 
This variance disappears on appeal, where individual and 







 203. Cf. Gillian K. Hadfield, Exploring Economic and Democratic Theories of Civil Litigation: 
Differences Between Individual and Organizational Litigants in the Disposition of Federal Civil 
Cases, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1275, 1280–81 (2005) (reporting that cases involving organizational 
plaintiffs are more likely than cases involving individual plaintiffs to be resolved through 
settlements instead of through adjudication). 
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Table 6: Success Rates for Organizational and Individual Plaintiffs 
  




















Individual 19/205 9% 16/51 31% 2/65 3% 37/321 12% 
 
Org. Only 0/1 0% 0/0 0% 0/0 0% 0/1 0% 
 
Both 18/63 29% 7/25 28% 0/1 0% 25/89 28% 
  p < 0.001 p > 0.10 p > 0.10 p < 0.001 
 
3. What Types of Laws Are Being Challenged?204  It will come as 
no surprise that litigation and success rates vary depending on the type 
of weapon regulation challenged. Both Heller and McDonald expressly 
affirmed the constitutionality of certain restrictions—like firearm bans 
for convicted felons205—which thus present relatively weak claims. But 
the Supreme Court left open the constitutionality of dozens of others. 
We sought to compare litigation and success rates across the full range 
of challenged weapons regulations. Appendix C contains the results of 
this effort for all subclassifications in our scheme. The next table 








 204. As noted above, Appendix B provides our categorization scheme.  
 205. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27; McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 
U.S. 742, 786 (2010). 
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Table 7: Success Rates by Category of Law Challenged 
  















Who 13/218 6% 7/117 6% 2/162 1% 22/497 4% 
What 4/47 9% 4/26 15% 6/31 19% 14/104 13% 
Where 7/29 24% 1/12 8% 0/4 0% 8/45 18% 
When 3/54 6% 0/26 0% 1/28 4% 4/108 4% 
How 1/4 25% 0/1 0% 1/10 10% 2/15 13% 
Bus. 
Res. 
3/28 11% 0/5 0% 0/1 0% 3/34 9% 
Pub. 
Car. 
5/34 15% 3/9 33% 29/127 23% 37/170 22% 
Gun 
Reg. 
2/35 6% 14/19 74% 2/60 3% 18/114 16% 
Official  0/32 0% 0/5 0% 0/7 0% 0/44 0% 
Misc. 0/10 0% 0/1 0% 0/11 0% 0/22 0% 
  p < 0.05 p < 0.001 p < 0.001 p < 0.001 
 
By far, the most common type of challenge was to “who” bans, or 
prohibitions on possession by certain classes of people. This category 
accounted for 43 percent of all challenges in the dataset. Challenges 
that fell into the “who” category were generally losers, with a success 
rate of just 4 percent.206 This relatively low success rate was largely due 
to 273 challenges to felon-in-possession statutes. These challenges, 
which account for 24 percent of the entire dataset, were rejected 99 
percent of time and enjoyed no success at the federal appellate level 
during our study period.207 
Three categories of challenges fared worse than challenges to 
 
 206. Unlike the dataset as a whole, federal appellate and trial courts were equally likely to 
reject challenges in this category (6 percent success rates in both court systems). Meanwhile, both 
were more receptive than state appellate courts, where litigants had success in only 1 percent of 
challenges. 
 207. Of all subcategories, however, this one seems most likely to experience an upsurge in 
successes going forward. After our study period concluded, the Third Circuit granted as-applied 
relief to two plaintiffs challenging the federal felon-in-possession law, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) 
(2012). See Binderup v. Att’y Gen., 836 F.3d 336, 356–57 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc), cert. denied, 
137 S. Ct. 2323 (2017). That opinion will likely incentivize more challenges and lead to more 
successes. This likely effect of Binderup exemplifies an important limitation: the data presented 
in Table 7 is not temporally weighted, meaning that challenges decided early and late in the study 
period are counted the same. The discussion therefore does not purport to account for the impact 
of controlling precedent established after the accumulation of contrary case law. 
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“who” bans: challenges to “when” bans, official action, and twenty-two 
challenges that defied easy categorization. “When” bans, or temporary 
restrictions on the possession of weapons, accounted for 9 percent of 
the dataset and had a success rate of just 4 percent. Challenges to 
official action—including gun seizures during arrests, court rulings on 
burdens in criminal cases, and employee policies—made up 4 percent 
of the database and uniformly failed. Miscellaneous challenges, such as 
those contesting a state’s gun control regime generally208 or a murder 
conviction,209 accounted for 2 percent of the dataset and also had no 
success. 
Litigants targeting other types of restrictions succeeded at a higher 
rate. Challenges to “what” restrictions, or those on weapon 
categories,210 accounted for 9 percent of the dataset and had a 13 
percent success rate, more than three times as high as “who” bans. 
Within “what” restrictions, litigants did better in federal appellate 
court (15 percent success) than federal trial court (9 percent success). 
Litigants also fared better when they challenged regulations on 
nonlethal weapons (25 percent success) than other types of weapons.211 
This last observation is logical: the lethality of a regulated weapon and 
the government’s concern for public safety—the usual rationale for 
weapon regulation212—should rise and fall together.213 
One controversial policy in the public debate has been less so in 
court: bans on assault weapons. The database contains eighteen 
challenges to assault weapon bans—ten in federal court and eight in 
 
 208. See, e.g., Mongielo v. Cuomo, 968 N.Y.S.2d 828, 829–30 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013). 
 209. See, e.g., Klinefelter v. Pennywell, No. EDCV 12–1847–R (OP), 2013 WL 5840309, at *20 
(C.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2013). 
 210. This category contains challenges to both outright bans and highly restrictive registration 
schemes. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 922(o); 26 U.S.C. §§ 5841, 5845(a)–(b) (2012) (banning possession 
of machine guns unless lawfully possessed before enactment of the Firearm Owners Protection 
Act of 1986; banning possession of such lawfully possessed machine guns subject to federal 
registration and fees).  
 211. See Appendix C. 
 212. See Ruben, supra note 91, at 164 (“[Public safety] was the interest set forth by the 
government in Heller and . . . has been the interest relied upon in almost all Second Amendment 
cases thereafter.” (citations omitted)). 
 213. See generally Joseph Blocher & Darrell A.H. Miller, Lethality, Public Carry, and 
Adequate Alternatives, 53 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 279 (2016) (arguing that regulations of lethal 
weapons are more constitutionally defensible where adequate nonlethal alternatives are 
available); Eugene Volokh, Nonlethal Self-Defense, (Almost Entirely) Nonlethal Weapons, and 
the Rights to Keep and Bear Arms and Defend Life, 62 STAN. L. REV. 199, 216 (2009) (concluding 
that nonlethal weapons are covered by the Second Amendment and noting that they facilitate 
crime “at a lower level of harm than lethal weapons such as guns and knives”). 
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state appellate court. During the study period, courts rejected all but 
two: Wilson v. County of Cook, in which the Illinois Supreme Court 
remanded for further fact finding,214 and Cutonilli v. State,215 in which 
the district court stayed proceedings pending the outcome in a similar 
case, Kolbe v. Hogan. In Kolbe, the Fourth Circuit ultimately upheld 
the ban.216 
“Where” bans, or prohibitions on weapons possession, shooting 
ranges, and gun stores in specified places, made up 4 percent of the 
database. These challenges fared better than challenges to most other 
categories of laws, with a success rate of 18 percent. Courts facing 
challenges in this subset generally agreed that bans on possession in or 
near schools are constitutional, consistent with Heller’s carve-out for 
“sensitive places.”217 Some courts disagreed about what makes a space 
“sensitive” beyond certain obvious categories, with two federal district 
courts granting relief from restrictions they deemed too broad.218 One 
of those decisions was reversed on appeal.219 In the wake of the other, 
the federal government reconsidered a restriction on firearms on U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers property.220 Aside from successful challenges 
to location-based bans on possession, several restrictions on gun stores 
and shooting ranges within Chicago were struck down.221 
 
 214. See generally Wilson v. Cty. of Cook, 968 N.E.2d 641 (Ill. 2012). In July 2017, a revised 
complaint was filed in this case. See Complaint, Wilson v. Cty. of Cook, No. 2017-CH-10345 (Ill. 
Cir. Ct. Jul. 28, 2017).  
 215. Cutonilli v. State, No. JKB-15-629, 2015 WL 5719572 (D. Md. Sept. 28, 2015). 
 216. See id. at *6; Kolbe v. Hogan, 849 F.3d 114, 135–41 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc). 
 217. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008). 
 218. See Morris v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 60 F. Supp. 3d 1120, 1125–26 (D. Idaho 2014) 
(holding unconstitutional an “outright ban” on handguns on Army Corps of Engineers property); 
Morris v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 990 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1088–89 (D. Idaho 2014) (enjoining 
the Army Corps of Engineers from enforcing a ban on handguns possessed by law-abiding 
individuals on Corps-owned public lands); Bonidy v. U.S. Postal Serv., No. 10-CV-02408-RPM, 
2013 WL 3448130, at *5–7 (D. Colo. July 9, 2013) (holding that a ban on firearms within U.S. Post 
Offices was constitutional, but banning firearms in the surrounding parking lot was not), rev’d, 
790 F.3d 1121 (10th Cir. 2015) (holding both bans—in U.S. Post Office parking lots and 
buildings—constitutional).  
 219. Bonidy, 790 F.3d at 1128–29, rev’g No. 10-CV-02408-RPM, 2013 WL 3448130 (D. Colo. 
July 9, 2013). 
 220. See News Release, Mountain States Legal Found., Trump Administration Seeks 
Resolution of Idaho Woman’s Army Corps Gun Ban Battle (Mar. 3, 2017), https://www 
.mountainstateslegal.org/news-updates/news-releases/2017/03/03/trump-administration-seeks-
resolution-of-idaho-woman-s-army-corps-gun-ban-battle#.WYEDNITytpg 
[https://perma.cc/23XY-FT67] (noting that federal lawyers filed a motion indicating the 
government’s willingness to “reconsider[] the firearms policy” (alteration in original)). 
 221. See Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 771 (7th Cir. 2011) (overturning ban on firing 
ranges); Ezell v. City of Chicago, 70 F. Supp. 3d 871, 884 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (overturning requirement 
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“How” restrictions, those requiring safe storage of firearms, have 
rarely been a litigation target—they account for just 1 percent of the 
dataset. Overall, this category has a 13 percent success rate, with a 
single victory at each of the federal trial and state appellate levels.222 
This is one area, however, where success may prove short-lived. The 
court in one of the two cases denied a motion to dismiss a complaint 
challenging Illinois’s safe storage law, but noted that the plaintiffs “may 
face an uphill battle on the merits of their claim” at later stages.223 The 
claim then became moot and was dismissed after a plaintiff in the case 
moved to another state.224 In the other case, the court remanded for the 
trial court to apply heightened scrutiny to Ohio’s vehicle storage law.225 
On remand and in a subsequent appeal, the law was upheld.226 
Challenges to business restrictions and fees accounted for 3 
percent of the dataset and had a 9 percent success rate. Courts rejected 
the few Second Amendment challenges to background check 
requirements and dealer license requirements. Two challenges to 
restrictions on the sale or transfer of firearms227 and one challenge to 
restrictions placed on shooting ranges228 succeeded in federal district 
court. 
Challenges to public carry restrictions had a success rate of 22 
percent, which is the highest in our dataset. This category, which 
included both public carry bans and public carry permitting schemes, 
touches on the contentious issue of to what extent the government can 
regulate weapons outside the home. Much of the success in this 
litigation, however, was limited to bans on public carry, which were 
ultimately struck down in Washington, D.C., and Illinois, both of the 
 
that shooting ranges be located in manufacturing districts); Ill. Ass’n of Firearms Retailers v. City 
of Chicago, 961 F. Supp. 2d 928, 931 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (overturning ban on gun stores). 
 222. See Second Amendment Arms, 135 F. Supp. 3d at 765 (denying motion to dismiss safe-
storage law); State v. Shover, No. 25944, 2012 WL 3595127, at *3–4 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 22, 2012) 
(remanding vehicle safe-storage law for application of heightened scrutiny). 
 223. Second Amendment Arms, 135 F. Supp. 3d at 765. 
 224. See Notification of Docket Entry at 1, Second Amendment Arms v. City of Chicago, No. 
10-cv-04257 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 27, 2016). 
 225. Shover, 2012 WL 3595127, at *3–4. 
 226. See State v. Shover, 8 N.E.3d 358, 361–65 (Ohio Ct. App. 2014). 
 227. See Mance v. Holder, 74 F. Supp. 3d 795, 803–13 (N.D. Tex. 2015); Ill. Ass’n of Firearms 
Retailers v. City of Chicago, 961 F. Supp. 2d 928, 936–47 (N.D. Ill. 2014). In January 2018, the 
Fifth Circuit reversed the district court decision in Mance. See Mance v. Sessions, 880 F.3d 183 
(5th Cir. 2018) (upholding federal law banning sale of firearms to out-of-state residents).  
 228. See Ezell v. City of Chicago, 70 F. Supp. 3d 871, 881–92 (N.D. Ill. 2014). In January 2017, 
the Seventh Circuit agreed with the district court that certain restrictions on shooting ranges in 
Chicago violated the Second Amendment. See Ezell v. City of Chicago, 846 F.3d 888, 898 (2017). 
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places they existed. The success rate in those cases was 47 percent, with 
fifty-seven of the sixty-two total challenges in this subcategory arising 
out of Illinois. Just one federal appellate court has considered the 
constitutionality of a public carry ban, striking down the Illinois law.229 
The database includes eighty-nine challenges to licensing regimes 
for public carry (either open or concealed), eight of which succeeded, 
for an overall success rate of 9 percent. No court held that requiring 
public carry licenses was per se unconstitutional, and challenges in 
“shall-issue” jurisdictions230 uniformly failed. Five of the eight 
successful challenges arose from the “may-issue” policies231 in 
Maryland or California,232 policies which later were upheld by the 
Fourth and Ninth Circuits.233 The other three successes were in the 
D.C. District Court and Court of Appeals.234 One of the three District 
of Columbia successes was a challenge to a may-issue policy similar to 
Maryland’s and California’s.235 Unlike in those two places, however, 
the D.C. Circuit recently agreed that the policy was unconstitutional,236 
setting up a clear circuit split. The D.C. Circuit’s opinion came after the 
conclusion of our study period, and so was not coded. 
The final category of challenges involved laws calling for the 
permitting of firearms or of people desiring to possess or purchase 
them.237 These restrictions have also been controversial, resulting in 
114 challenges and a 16 percent success rate. Much of that success 
 
 229. See Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 935–42 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 230. See Blocher, supra note 81, at 219 (defining “shall issue” regimes as those that “compel 
states to issue public carrying licenses to anyone who is not a felon, mentally ill, or otherwise 
excluded from the scope of Second Amendment coverage”). 
 231. Id. at 218 (describing “may issue” regimes as those that require a showing of good cause 
in order to obtain a public carry permit). 
 232. See Richards v. Prieto, 560 F. App’x 681, 682 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d on reh’g sub nom., 
Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2016); Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d 
1144, 1148 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d on reh’g en banc, 824 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2016); Birdt v. San 
Bernardino Sheriff’s Dept., No. EDCV 13–0673–VAP (JEM), 2014 WL 2608127, at *8 (C.D. Cal. 
June 9, 2014); Woollard v. Sheridan, 863 F. Supp. 2d 462, 464–65 (D. Md. 2012), rev’d, 712 F.3d 
865 (4th Cir. 2013); Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego, 678 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1055–56 (S.D. Cal. 2010). 
 233. See Peruta, 824 F.3d at 942; Woollard, 712 F.3d at 882. 
 234. See Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 107 F. Supp. 3d 1, 14 (D.D.C. 2015), rev’d, 864 F.3d 
650 (D.C. Cir. 2017); Jackson v. United States, 76 A.3d 920, 943–48 (D.C. 2013); Plummer v. 
United States, 983 A.2d 323, 334–42 (D.C. 2009). 
 235. See Wrenn, 107 F. Supp. 3d at 3–4. 
 236. See Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 668 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
 237. Our study categorized three types of licenses/permits: for public carry, for particular 
firearms, and for people desiring to possess firearms. The discussion in this paragraph refers to 
the latter types of licensing—those involving firearms and people, rather than the manner of 
bearing.  
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corresponds to litigation involving the District of Columbia’s evolving 
regulatory regime.238 Absent the litigation in the District of Columbia, 
the success rate in this category drops to 3 percent. 
B. Trends in the Evolving Second Amendment 
The preceding section has given a snapshot of Second 
Amendment outcomes over the past decade, across a variety of 
different measures. In this section, we introduce a new metric—that of 
time. Based on our data, Second Amendment challenges experienced 
a steadily increasing success rate, from 0 percent in the challenges 
brought after Heller in 2008 to 19 and 15 percent in 2014 and 2015, 
respectively. 
 Table 8: Success Rate by Year 
 
Because we have coded not just case results but the content of 
judicial opinions, we explore what is happening doctrinally as success 
rates rise. Doing so, however, presents empirical problems, for at least 
two reasons. First, the kinds of questions one must ask in order to code 
methodology are almost inevitably more subjective than those 
regarding the content of the law at issue. We have tried to minimize 
this problem by translating subjective questions into objective ones. 
For example, instead of asking “whether the court employed an 
originalist methodology,” we asked coders whether the court cited 
materials from various historical periods. By using such proxies we can 
 
 238. See Heller v. District of Columbia, 801 F.3d 264, 270 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Heller II, 670 F.3d 
1244, 1248 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 
Opinion year  
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Total 
Successful 
Challenges 
0 4 7 12 14 13 36 22 0 108 
0% 4% 5% 7% 9% 9% 19% 15% 0% 9% 
Total 
Challenges 
70 114 143 178 161 144 193 145 5 1153 
 p < 0.001* 
 *Excluding 2016 
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at least gain some traction on larger and potentially more subjective 
questions. 
The second problem, which is related to the first, is that courts do 
not always announce what they are doing. By this we do not mean that 
the attitudinalists are necessarily right about ideology—a matter on 
which, again, we are not attempting to weigh in—but simply that 
doctrinal analysis may be sub silentio. A court might do a tiers-of-
scrutiny analysis by analyzing the government interest and assessing 
whether a law is tailored to meet it, without ever invoking words like 
“compelling,” “narrowly,” “substantially,” and so on. Such a case 
might then escape coding, particularly as the survey questions 
themselves become more objective and precise in order to meet the 
first objection about subjectivity. 
Perhaps as a result of these two problems (although it is hard to 
know for certain), our tests of intercoder reliability returned lower 
scores for doctrinal questions than for the kinds of categorization 
questions discussed in Part III.A. The following conclusions are 
accordingly tentative. 
In order to set the chronological stage, we can start with objective 
numbers: 
Table 9: Second Amendment Challenges by Opinion Year 
 Opinion year 
 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Total 
Federal Trial  57 51 81 54 57 41 82 64 4 491 
Federal Appellate  8 30 25 44 35 24 26 29 0 221 
State Appellate  5 33 37 80 69 79 85 52 1 441 
Total 70 114 143 178 161 144 193 145 5 1153 
  p > 0.10*   




One might have expected an initial wave of cases addressing the 
questions Heller left open and then a decrease over time as the law 
became clear and litigants began to “price in” their likelihood of 
success.239 That does not seem to have happened. Other than a bump 
 
 239. Cf. George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 1, 4–6 (1984) (explaining how litigants consider the likelihood of a judicial decision 
in selecting disputes for litigation). 
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in appeals cases a year after Heller—giving time for 2008 trials to 
conclude and be appealed—and a bump in state cases in 2011—after 
McDonald made the Second Amendment applicable to state and local 
regulations—the numbers are relatively flat across time. 
Our primary interest is in what is happening within those cases, 
and whether methodology has changed over time. Perhaps the 
broadest hypothesis is that, in the years since Heller, the Second 
Amendment has increasingly become “normal,” in the sense that 
Second Amendment cases are increasingly resolved by precedent and 
standard legal tests rather than original historical research. If so, our 
data should show increases in cases decided based on controlling 
precedent, and corresponding decreases in matters of first impression 
and direct citations to historical materials. 
Our data provides only partial support for this hypothesis. Heller 
remains the lodestar,240 in particular the paragraphs regarding 
“presumptively lawful” regulations. Courts considering a majority of 
the challenges in our study (60 percent) explicitly cited those 
paragraphs, though the ratio trended downward over time, perhaps 













 240. This provides some support—consistent with other empirical studies—that vertical 
precedent matters. See John Gruhl, The Supreme Court’s Impact on the Law of Libel: Compliance 
by Lower Federal Courts, 33 W. POL. Q. 502, 517 (1980) (finding high rates of compliance with 
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)); Donald R. Songer & Reginald S. Sheehan, 
Supreme Court Impact on Compliance and Outcomes: Miranda and New York Times in the United 
States Court of Appeals, 43 W. POL. Q. 297, 313 (1990) (finding “nearly universal compliance” 
with Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)).  
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Table 10: Citations to Heller Paragraphs on “Presumptively 
Lawful”Regulations 
 
Opinion year  





56 75 95 109 104 94 90 66 2 691 
80% 66% 66% 61% 65% 65% 47% 46% 40% 60% 




14 39 48 69 57 50 103 79 3 462 
20% 34% 34% 39% 35% 35% 53% 54% 60% 40% 
Total 
Challenges 
70 114 143 178 161 144 193 145 5 1153 
 p < 0.010*  
 *Excluding 2016  
 
Courts that invoke the “presumptively lawful” regulations 
paragraphs are much more likely (71 percent versus 45 percent) to 
devote more than three paragraphs to Second Amendment analysis, 
suggesting perhaps that Heller’s exceptions are not being used as a 
shortcut to avoid scrutiny. Moreover, the proportion of cases devoting 
more than three paragraphs of analysis to the Second Amendment 
challenge has not changed noticeably since Heller, and in fact was 
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Table 11: Number of Paragraphs Devoted to Second Amendment 
Discussion 
 Identifying the content of that analysis presents challenges. It is 
often said, both by critics and supporters, that the courts of appeals 
have universally adopted a two-part test for analyzing Second 
Amendment claims.241 But only a minority of the challenges in our 
dataset (41 percent) explicitly involved that test.242 
There are good reasons to suppose that these results underreport 
the influence and adoption of the two-part test, however, at least within 
the federal courts. Just 32 percent of state appellate challenges applied 
the two-part test, compared with 46 percent of federal challenges. 
Moreover, as in other areas, courts may not be explicit when they are 
using the two-part test—many of the cases that involve the application 
of tiered scrutiny might actually be instances of courts assuming 
coverage and skipping to the second step.243 Finally, the percentage of 
 
 241. See supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text.  
 242. Use of the two-part test increased from 2009 to 2010, when the test was first articulated 
in United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010). But, interestingly, our coders 
identified fifty-five cases in 2008 and 2009 that applied the two-part test, suggesting that 
Marzzarella effectively codified a test that was already in use, rather than creating one from 
scratch.  
 243. The dataset shows one hundred challenges involving application of scrutiny but not the 
two-part test. Reviewing these cases confirms that courts seem to be following the basic outlines 
of the two-part test even when they do not say so explicitly. The First Circuit, for example, does 
not seem to have officially adopted the two-part test, and none of its decisions in our dataset are 
coded as applying it. But in United States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2011), the court 
apparently assumed that the conduct at issue was covered and went on apply heightened scrutiny. 
 
Opinion year  




27 58 62 62 58 61 69 54 2 453 




43 56 81 116 103 83 124 91 3 700 
61% 49% 57% 65% 64% 58% 64% 63% 60% 61% 
Total 
Challenges 
70 114 143 178 161 144 193 145 5 1153 
 p > 0.10* 
 *Excluding 2016 
BLOCHER AND RUBEN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/12/2018  8:26 PM 
2018] FROM THEORY TO DOCTRINE 1491 
cases applying the two-part test increased steadily after 2012. This may 
reflect the growing impact of circuit opinions expressly adopting this 
decisional framework.244 Of the nine circuits that expressly adopted the 
two-part test, six did so in 2011 or later.245 
Table 12: Application of Two-Part Test 
 
Opinion year  




27 28 52 84 65 61 84 66 2 469 





43 86 91 94 96 83 109 79 3 684 
61% 75% 64% 53% 60% 58% 56% 54% 60% 59% 
Total 
Challenges 
70 114 143 178 161 144 193 145 5 1153 
 p < 0.10*  
 *Excluding 2016  
 
Our data provides support for the proposition—occasionally 
phrased as a complaint—that original historical analysis is not the sole 
driving force in Second Amendment cases.246 In just a small minority 
 
Similarly, in Hightower v. City of Boston, 693 F.3d 61 (1st Cir. 2012), the court held that the 
Second Amendment “claim fail[ed] whatever standard of scrutiny is used, even assuming there is 
some Second Amendment interest in carrying the concealed weapons at issue.” Id. at 74.  
 244. See United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1136 (9th Cir. 2013); Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of 
Am., Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 194 (5th Cir. 
2012); GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244, 1261 n.34 (11th Cir. 2012); United States 
v. Decastro, 682 F.3d 160, 163–64 (2d Cir. 2012); United States v. Greeno, 679 F.3d 510, 518 (6th 
Cir. 2012); Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244, 1252 (D.C. Cir. 2011); United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 
680 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792, 800–01 (10th Cir. 2010); Marzzarella, 
614 F.3d at 89. We omit the Seventh Circuit from this list. Though the Seventh Circuit purported 
to adopt the test in Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 700–04 (7th Cir. 2011), subsequent 
circuit precedent has opted for other doctrinal frames. For instance, in Friedman v. City of 
Highland Park, Ill., 784 F.3d 406 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 447 (2015), Judge 
Easterbrook explained:  
[I]nstead of . . . decid[ing] what “level” of scrutiny applies, and how it works . . . we 
think it better to ask whether a regulation bans weapons that were common at the time 
of ratification or those that have “some reasonable relationship to . . . a well regulated 
militia,” and whether law-abiding citizens retain adequate means of self-defense. 
Id. at 410 (citation omitted) (first citing District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 622–25 
(2008); then citing United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178–79 (1939)). 
 245. See Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127; Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc., 700 F.3d 185; 
GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc., 687 F.3d 1244; Decastro, 682 F.3d 160; Greeno, 679 F.3d 510; Heller II, 
670 F.3d 1244. 
 246. See supra note 91; see also Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1174–75 (9th Cir. 
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of challenges (16 percent) did the court cite historical sources from one 
of the periods we coded. Cited sources most commonly dated between 
1935 and 1968 (in 116 of 184 challenges), and only twenty-nine 
challenges prompted citations to the pre-1791 sources that played a 
prominent role in Heller.247 
Table 13: Citations to Historical Sources 
 Opinion year 
 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Total 
Pre-1791 Sources 3 3 7 3 6 0 5 2 0 29 
1791-1868 Sources 2 5 6 4 6 4 10 5 0 42 
1869-1891 Sources 5 9 10 7 5 5 7 2 0 50 
1892-1934 Sources 2 8 8 7 8 4 7 4 0 48 
1935-1968 Sources 5 11 26 19 24 4 13 14 0 116 
Total 11 19 36 30 31 11 29 17 0 184 
Total challenges 70 114 143 178 161 144 193 145 5 1153 
% Citing Hist. 
Sources 16% 17% 25% 17% 19% 8% 15% 12% 0% 16% 
 p > 0.10* 
 
*P-value calculated for last row: likelihood of citing any historical sources; 
excluding 2016 
 
Interestingly for our chronological story, the quantity of these 
citations did not change as we had predicted during the course of the 
study. We had expected that historical analysis would be displaced by 
precedent. It appears that original historical analysis has more 
longevity, albeit less initial prominence, than we imagined. 
Along the same lines, a similarly small percentage of challenges 
(18 percent) involved explicit consideration of whether a law was 
“longstanding” so as to fall within Heller’s exceptions. The data reflects 
no significant variation over time. 
 
2014), rev’d on reh’g en banc, 824 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2016) (“In light of Heller, the Second Circuit 
erred in outright rejecting history and tradition as unhelpful and ambiguous, and the Third and 
Fourth Circuits erred in following suit.” (citation omitted)). 
 247. Some opinions cite from more than one historical period, which is why row values do not 
sum to total values in Table 12.  
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Table 14: Consideration of Whether Weapon Law is Longstanding 
 
Opinion year  




15 21 21 39 25 25 25 33 1 205 





55 93 122 139 136 119 168 112 4 948 
79% 82% 85% 78% 84% 83% 87% 77% 80% 82% 
Total 
Challenges 
70 114 143 178 161 144 193 145 5 1153 
 p > 0.10* 
 *Excluding 2016 
 
If not originalism, on what basis are courts deciding Second 
Amendment cases? One possibility, as suggested above, is that they are 
increasingly relying on the ever-growing body of controlling precedent. 
And yet the proportion of cases in which courts expressly held that the 
Second Amendment issue was already decided by a controlling opinion 
has remained near constant and has always been low, representing only 
239 total cases, no higher than 25 percent in any given year (29 of 114 
in 2009). That said, this variable seems susceptible to undercoding—in 
only forty-eight cases did the court characterize the issue as one of first 
impression, leaving roughly three-quarters of the challenges coded as 
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Table 15: Challenges Governed by Controlling Opinions 
 
Opinion year  
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Total 
Controlling 
Opinion 
11 29 35 39 28 27 40 28 2 239 
Total 
Cases 
70 114 143 178 161 144 193 145 5 1153 
Percentage 16% 25% 24% 22% 17% 19% 21% 19% 40% 21% 
 p > 0.10* 
 *Excluding 2016 
 
There has been, however, at least one noticeable change in the 
doctrine over time: an increasing application of levels-of-scrutiny 
analysis. Challenges decided by levels-of-scrutiny analysis still 
represent a minority—just 29 percent of the entire dataset—but the 
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  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Total 
Strict Scrutiny 
0/4 0/4 0/2 0/1 1/2 0/1 2/9 2/3 0/1 5/27 
0% 0% 0% 0% 50% 0% 22% 67% 0% 19% 
Intermediate 
Scrutiny 
0/1 1/6 1/28 0/38 2/45 4/41 5/50 11/33 0/0 24/242 
0% 17% 4% 0% 4% 10% 10% 33% 0% 10% 
Rational Basis 
Review 
0/0 0/1 0/2 0/1 0/2 0/1 0/3 0/0 0/0 0/10 
0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
“Reasonableness” 
Review 
0/0 0/0 1/1 0/2 0/1 0/0 0/6 0/2 0/0 1/12 
0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 8% 
Applied a Level-
of-Scrutiny 
Analysis, But Did 
Not Specify 
0/3 0/2 1/2 1/7 2/7 0/9 4/10 0/1 0/0 8/41 
0% 0% 50% 14% 29% 0% 40% 0% 0% 20% 
Combined 
Scrutiny 
0/8 1/13 3/35 1/49 5/57 4/52 11/78 13/39 0/1 38/332 
0% 8% 9% 2% 9% 8% 14% 33% 0% 11% 
Total Challenges 70 114 143 178 161 144 193 145 5 1153 
Percentage 
Applying Scrutiny 
11% 11% 24% 28% 35% 36% 40% 27% 20% 29% 
  p < 0.025* 
  
*P-value calculated on final row: percentage of challenges facing scrutiny analysis; 
excluding 2016 
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Intermediate scrutiny has been the most prevalent form of 
scrutiny, no matter which category of court one considers. As between 
the court systems, when levels-of-scrutiny analysis is applied, federal 
appellate courts select intermediate scrutiny 79 percent of the time, 
more frequently than federal district courts (74 percent of the time) 
and state appellate courts (68 percent). Contrary to the common 
assertion, application of intermediate scrutiny has not invariably been 
fatal to Second Amendment claims. In fact, challenges subject to 
intermediate scrutiny prevailed at a rate (10 percent) slightly higher 
than the overall success rate for Second Amendment claims (9 
percent). Obviously the two variables are related—the former being a 
subset of the latter—but since intermediate scrutiny cases only account 
for 21 percent of the overall set, they are not entirely confounding. 
Claims triggering strict scrutiny succeeded at a higher rate (19 percent), 
but strict scrutiny was far from fatal to challenged weapon laws.248 Fully 
understanding those victories, however, requires a closer look at the 
subset of successful Second Amendment challenges, which is the 
subject of the next Part. 
IV.  WHAT MAKES FOR A SUCCESSFUL SECOND AMENDMENT 
CHALLENGE? 
There are innumerable reasons why a court might reject a Second 
Amendment challenge—perhaps it was brought by a felon (273 
challenges) and therefore governed directly by Heller, or perhaps the 
government has shown that the law sufficiently furthers a sufficiently 
strong government interest (237 challenges). Particularly in light of the 
low success rate, the most interesting set of challenges are the 
exceptions: those that have succeeded.249 What do they have in 
common? What can they tell us about Second Amendment doctrine? 
 
 248. Cf. Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict 
Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 869–71 (2006) (concluding that challenges 
subject to strict scrutiny succeed at different rates, depending on the right invoked and other 
specified factors). 
 249. As noted above, our analysis in this section focuses not on cases, but on challenges—of 
which one opinion might address many. See, e.g., Ezell v. City of Chicago, 70 F. Supp. 3d 871, 875, 
882 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (addressing separately each of the plaintiffs’ eleven separate Second 
Amendment claims). 
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A. High-Level Observations 
About two-thirds of successful challenges in the dataset are at the 
appellate level (70 out of 108). And of those, the appellate court 
rejected at least part of the lower court’s Second Amendment holding 
96 percent of the time. This suggests that, at least in these cases, the 
appeals courts are not acting as rubber stamps after trial courts dismiss 
Second Amendment claims. 
Table 17: Affirmance Rates in Successful Appeals 





1 2 3 
3% 5% 4% 
Did Not Affirm 
12 19 31 
41% 46% 44% 
Affirmed in part 
16 20 36 
55% 49% 51% 
Total 29 41 70 
 
Within federal courts of appeals, about 96 percent of successes 
came out of the Second, Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits—
far higher than the 54 percent (119 of 219) of Second Amendment cases 
heard by those circuits. These are circuits where states with relatively 
strict gun laws are located,250 so it may well be the case that other 
circuits have fewer Second Amendment “wins” because they do not 
have as many strict gun laws to challenge. For example, challenges to 
municipal gun regulations succeed more frequently than challenges to 
state or federal regulations (22 percent versus 12 and 3 percent), and 
municipal gun regulation is strictly preempted in every state outside of 
the circuits listed above.251 Regardless of such discrepancies, the 
relatively high proportion of successes in the Second, Fourth, Seventh, 
Ninth, and D.C. Circuits is consistent with the view that these courts 
are not in open rebellion against the Second Amendment.252 
 
 250. See supra notes 190–94 and accompanying text. 
 251. Jon S. Vernick & Lisa M. Hepburn, State and Federal Gun Laws: Trends for 1970–99, in 
EVALUATING GUN POLICY: EFFECTS ON CRIME AND VIOLENCE 345, 349 (Jens Ludwig & Philip 
J. Cook eds., 2003). 
 252. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
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First 0 (0%) Seventh 3 (11%) 
Second 2 (7%) Eighth 0 (0%) 
Third 0 (0%) Ninth 4 (14%) 
Fourth 4 (14%) Tenth 0 (0%) 
Fifth 0 (0%) Eleventh 0 (0%) 
Sixth 1 (4%) D.C. 14 (50%) 
  Total 28 (100%)   
 
Six states and the District of Columbia account for all successes at 
the state appellate level, with the vast majority occurring in Illinois (68 
percent). These are overwhelmingly a result of the decision in Aguilar 
striking down Illinois’s public carry ban, which gave way to a deluge of 
attacks on past convictions for violating that law. 
Table 19: Successful Challenges by State253 
State Successful Challenges Percent of Total 




Illinois 28 68% 




Ohio 2 5% 
Wisconsin 1 2% 




 253. This chart omits states without any successful challenges. 
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B. Doctrinal Observations 
The way challenges are presented to the courts—either facially or 
as-applied254—matters, and the latter can be expected to have a higher 
rate of success.255 That is certainly true of Second Amendment 
litigation in federal court, as the majority of all Second Amendment 
successes (66 percent) came in cases where at least one form of relief 
sought was as applied. State appellate litigation deviates from this 
pattern as a result of the high number of post-Aguilar opinions out of 
Illinois granting facial relief. 











9 9 18 36 
24% 31% 44% 33% 
As-applied 
14 4 6 24 
37% 14% 15% 22% 
Both 
13 13 13 39 
34% 45% 32% 36% 
Unspecified 
2 3 4 9 
5% 10% 10% 8% 
Total 38 29 41 108 
 
Recent cases have expanded the availability of as-applied challenges in 
the Second Amendment context,256 which suggests that the number of 
successful challenges is likely to rise as well. 
Our evidence suggests that, within successful challenges, where 
 
 254. Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 236, 
236 (1994) (“Conventional wisdom holds that a court may declare a statute unconstitutional in 
one of two manners: (1) the court may declare it invalid on its face, or (2) the court may find the 
statute unconstitutional as applied to a particular set of circumstances.”).  
 255. Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449–51 (2008) 
(explaining preference for as-applied challenges). 
 256. Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 837 F.3d 678, 682 (6th Cir. 2016) (en banc) 
(permitting as-applied challenge to federal prohibition on possession by people subject to a prior 
involuntary mental health commitment, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) (2012)); Binderup v. Att’y Gen. 
U.S., 836 F.3d 336, 356–57 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc) (granting as-applied relief to plaintiffs 
challenging the federal felon-in-possession law, § 922(g)(1)). But see Hamilton v. Pallozzi, 848 
F.3d 614, 626 (4th Cir. 2017) (rejecting analysis from Binderup and holding that “conviction of a 
felony necessarily removes one from the class of ‘law-abiding, responsible citizens’ for the 
purposes of the Second Amendment absent . . . narrow exceptions”). 
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the court finds that a law infringes on the “core” or “central 
component” of the right, the burden on the government increases. In 
94 percent of the successful challenges where the court found that the 
burden was not on the core of the right, the court applied intermediate, 
as opposed to strict, scrutiny. Meanwhile, courts applied intermediate 
scrutiny only 14 percent of the time when a burden did fall on the core 
of the right. Otherwise, the court applied strict scrutiny (29 percent) or, 
more commonly, granted relief without making clear what standard the 
court was applying (57 percent). 
Table 21: Burden on Second Amendment “Core” vs. Level of Scrutiny 





















4 2 0 0 8 14 




1 15 0 0 0 16 
6% 94% 0% 0% 0% 100% 
Total 5 17 0 0 8 30 
 
Only federal courts appear to regularly make the “core” inquiry: 
it was explicit in just four successful state appellate challenges, perhaps 
because fewer state courts are relying on the two-part test. 
Heller looked to history to strike down the District of Columbia’s 
handgun ban. Since then, briefs, scholars, and litigants have debated 
whether history supports one side or the other in Second Amendment 
cases.257 Courts explaining why Second Amendment challenges 
succeed cite to historical sources (defined as non-case-law sources from 
before 1968) 20 percent of the time, a slightly higher proportion than 
the set as a whole (16 percent). This suggests that judicial historical 
 
 257. Compare Brief for Everytown for Gun Safety as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees and 
Affirmance at 10–27, Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (en banc) (No. 
16-7025) (arguing historical evidence supports constitutionality of D.C. gun regulation), with 
Brief for National Rifle Association of America, Inc., as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs-
Appellees and Affirmance at 10–15, Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650 (D.C. Cir. 2017) 
(en banc) (No. 16-7067) (arguing the contrary). 
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analysis may influence success in Second Amendment litigation, 
though we found no evidence of a significant relationship in 
regression.258 A majority of these challenges cite to pre-1891 sources, 
which Heller deemed most probative. Federal courts are much more 
likely than state appellate courts to cite history when explaining why a 
Second Amendment claim prevails. 
Table 22: Historical Citations in Successful Challenges 









2 6 0 8 
1791-1868 
Sources 
2 3 2 7 
1869-1891 
Sources 
3 3 2 8 
1892-1934 
Sources 
3 2 2 7 
1935-1968 
Sources 
4 4 1 9 
Any Period 10 9 3 22 
Total 
Successes 
38 29 41 108 
Percentage 26% 31% 7% 20% 
 
The two-part test was applied in 50 percent of successful 
challenges. Interestingly, that number jumps to 79 percent in federal 
appellate court, but drops to just 22 percent in state appellate court, a 






 258. Cf. Richard A. Posner, In Defense of Looseness: The Supreme Court and Gun Control, 
NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 27, 2008, at 35 (concluding that Heller’s approach was “not evidence of 
disinterested historical inquiry” but rather “evidence of the ability of well-staffed courts to 
produce snow jobs”). 
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Table 23: Application of Two-Part Test in Successful Challenges 









22 23 9 54 
58% 79% 22% 50% 
Court Does Not 
Apply Two-Part 
Test 
16 6 32 54 
42% 21% 78% 50% 
Total 38 29 41 108 
 
When the two-part test was applied in these cases, the court either 
applied heightened scrutiny to strike down the challenged policy (61 
percent) or dealt with the case in another way. Federal appellate 
courts, for example, often remanded to district courts to apply 
heightened scrutiny in the first instance. 
Table 24: Outcome of Two-Part Test in Successful Challenges 
C. Regressions 
The empirical results reported until this point include direct 
results and contingency tables for one or more coded variables. The 
former are simply the survey results, reported either in raw numbers or 
percentages. The latter give a basic view of the interaction between 
multiple variables. 
We have also made use of another statistical modeling tool: 
regression analysis. Regressions can help demonstrate how a 
dependent variable—in our case, the success or not of a Second 
Amendment claim—changes when other, independent variables are 
changed. The basic idea is to establish which of many possible 
independent variables is most closely associated with changes in the 













19 8 6 33 
86% 35% 67% 61% 
Other 
3 15 3 21 
14% 65% 33% 39% 
Total 22 23 9 54 
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dependent variable. For example, regression analysis can help show 
not just whether success rates are higher in particular courts but 
whether, holding all else equal, filing a particular claim in one court as 
opposed to another will increase its odds of success. 
But many variables are related—the impact, or odds multiplier, of 
one variable can have an impact on another. This complicates the 
analysis. One way to capture these interrelationships is through the use 
of multiple regression: identifying a cluster of independent variables 
and testing them simultaneously. The calculation and interpretation of 
results are complex when using multiple regression analysis, precisely 
because of the possible interrelationship between those variables. 
Multiple regression is therefore especially sensitive to the choice of 
independent variables—a strongly predictive variable can be weaker, 
or even negative, with the addition of other variables. 
Using fixed effects logit models and with the assistance of an 
empiricist,259 we tested five clusters of independent variables to see if 
and how well they predict success. We settled on these five models after 
initially testing a larger range of variables and ruling out those that 
were not predictive, statistically significant, or otherwise noteworthy. 
We plan to return to those variables in future work. The results are 












 259. See generally PAUL D. ALLISON, FIXED EFFECTS REGRESSION MODELS (2009). We owe 
an enormous debt of gratitude to Guangya Liu of the J. Michael Goodson Law Library at Duke 
Law School for her help in designing and performing the regression analysis. 
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Table 25: Odds Ratios for Winning Second Amendment Challenges 
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 Models 1 and 2 seek to test the hypothesis, explicit in a common 
critique of Second Amendment case law,260 that federal appellate 
courts are especially resistant to granting Second Amendment relief. 
Contrary to that theory, Models 1 and 2 show that litigation in federal 
appellate courts is correlated with success, not failure, as compared to 
litigation in federal trial courts or state appellate courts. If a Second 
Amendment challenge is litigated in federal appellate court as opposed 
to state appellate court, the odds of success increase by 65 percent. If 
the challenge is litigated in federal appellate court as opposed to 
federal trial court, the odds of success increase by 84 percent. These 
models suggest that claims about neglect of the Second Amendment 
right in the federal appellate courts are overblown. 
Of course, the venue of litigation is not the only important driver 
of success or failure. Other substantive factors matter, and rightly so. 
Models 3 and 4 seek to test some of them. Model 3 includes variables 
relating to the context in which a challenge is brought (civil versus 
criminal) and the authority for the challenged law, policy, or official 
action, be it state, federal, municipal, or other. Three sets of variables 
stand out as having a statistically significant impact on success.261 First, 
a civil claim is 71 percent more likely to succeed than a criminal claim. 
Second, challenges to federal laws, as opposed to state laws, 
correspond with a 63 percent decrease in the odds of success. Third, 
challenges to municipal laws, as opposed to state laws, correspond with 
an 86 percent increase in the odds of success. 
Model 4 asks whether the category of law matters. In this model, 
two categories returned statistically significant results at the p < 0.05 
level. Challenges to “who” bans, as opposed to the other categories, 
are 60 percent less likely to succeed. This is consistent with our analysis 
of Table 7, and the fact that 96 percent of challenges to “who” bans 
failed during the study period. 
Challenges to public carry regimes, by contrast, have a higher rate 
of success than the average Second Amendment case—a result that 
increases when one controls for year. As noted in Table 7, these 
challenges have prevailed 22 percent of the time—roughly two and a 
half times the overall success rate—and our regression reflects that 
 
 260. See supra notes 64–83 and accompanying text. 
 261. Not all variables we tested in these models returned statistically significant results. We 
consider statistically significant those variables that returned a p-value less than 0.05, which is a 
commonly accepted threshold. See ALLISON, supra note 259. Such variables are indicated with 
***, **, or * in Table 25. 
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they multiply the odds of success by 3.72. 
But success is not static across public carry subcategories, and 
much of the high success rate can be attributed to litigation involving 
bans on public carry in Illinois and the District of Columbia. In 
particular, challenges to the Illinois and D.C. bans are almost 16 times 
more likely to succeed than challenges to other types of public carry 
restrictions. Compared to the entire universe of gun laws in the 
database, challenges to these public carry bans are close to 19 times 
more likely to succeed. Challenges to permitting schemes for open or 
concealed carry, meanwhile, are 74 percent less likely to succeed than 
challenges to public carry bans. 
Finally, Model 5 looks at select doctrinal considerations. Our goal 
with this model was to test whether certain doctrinal features are 
related to the success of Second Amendment claims. We selected these 
variables based in part on our own sense of what would likely correlate 
with success (for example, a finding that a regulation touches on the 
“core” of the Amendment) and a preliminary regression of many 
doctrinal variables. 
The results confirm that certain factors relating to how a court 
considers Second Amendment claims point to success or failure. Two 
factors stood out as particularly significant. First, challenges that spawn 
less than three paragraphs of attention have a 56 percent lower chance 
of winning. Second, if the court concludes that the challenged 
regulation burdens the “core” of the right to keep and bear arms, the 
odds of success multiply by 5.76. 
These simple models represent five different ways to understand 
the factors driving the success or failure of Second Amendment claims. 
They are by no means the only ways to do so, and in future work we 
plan to pursue deeper analysis of these and other variables. 
CONCLUSION 
In important ways, the Second Amendment belongs increasingly 
to lawyers and legal analysis. The Supreme Court’s decision in District 
of Columbia v. Heller presented judges, advocates, and scholars with a 
remarkable responsibility and opportunity to construct constitutional 
doctrine regarding the right to keep and bear arms. Over the past 
decade, more than one thousand opinions, scores of scholarly books 
and articles, and innumerable public and private debates show that this 
task is well underway. We have attempted to provide an empirical 
account of where the doctrine is and how it got there. 
BLOCHER AND RUBEN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/12/2018  8:26 PM 
2018] FROM THEORY TO DOCTRINE 1507 
That does not mean that Second Amendment doctrine can be 
reduced to an equation or that it is susceptible to the kind of soundbite 
analysis that some advocates urge. But our analysis does suggest at 
least a few major observations: 
The low success rate of Second Amendment claims does not show 
that the right is being underenforced. It has become an article of faith in 
some quarters that courts are refusing to enforce the Second 
Amendment right articulated in Heller.262 Fully evaluating this claim 
would require the establishment of a baseline that is beyond the scope 
of this paper.263 But our data shows that the low rate of success 
probably has more to do with the claims being asserted than with 
judicial hostility to the right. Fully 24 percent of the challenges in our 
set are to felon-in-possession laws, all but 1 percent of which are 
failures—a result easily reconciled with Heller’s plain text. In fact, a 
clear majority of the challenges—742 of 1,153—arose in criminal cases, 
in which defense counsel might be expected to raise any 
nonsanctionable defense. The low rate of success in those cases (6 
percent) and the 126 cases involving pro se litigants (2 percent) pulls 
down the success rate as a whole. 
The Second Amendment is becoming more “legalistic.” Since 
Heller, Second Amendment cases have made increasing use of the 
common tools of constitutional doctrine. Heller’s own reference to 
“presumptively lawful” regulations is cited in 60 percent of the cases in 
our dataset. A steadily increasing percentage of courts—and a solid 
majority of federal courts of appeal—have applied the two-part test264 
or a levels-of-scrutiny analysis265 familiar to other areas of 
constitutional law. 
The doctrinal landscape is more diverse, nuanced, and interesting 
than many suppose. In the ten years since Heller, many broad and 
confident assertions have been made about Second Amendment 
doctrine, including by the authors of this paper: that it is governed by 
history, that the two-part test has been universally adopted, or that 
intermediate scrutiny is a rubber-stamp for regulation. Our data shows 
that the reality is far more complex—neither history266 nor the two-part 
 
 262. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 263. See supra notes 79–81 and accompanying text.  
 264. See supra Table 12. 
 265. See supra Table 16. 
 266. See supra Table 14. 
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test267 control the field, and intermediate scrutiny challenges actually 
succeed at a higher rate than the set as a whole.268 One possible 
interpretation of this is that Second Amendment doctrine exhibits the 
kind of complexity and demands the kind of attention as that of the 
First Amendment and others. 
Litigation, and especially successful litigation, is not evenly 
distributed geographically or across court systems. The Second 
Amendment is, in many ways, a profoundly regional Amendment. Two 
courts account for about one-third of the challenges in the federal 
courts of appeal; four states account for 68 percent of the state 
appellate challenges.269 Unsurprisingly, these circuits and states are 
among those with comparatively stringent gun control.270 Many also 
have relatively high success rates, both in absolute terms and 
proportionally.271 Moreover, a solid majority of Second Amendment 
litigation occurs in state courts (441 of 662 appellate challenges), 
although those cases rarely garner attention in scholarship. 
Party identity matters. The success rate of Second Amendment 
claims is highly correlated with who makes them, and whether and how 
they are represented. Civil litigants succeeded two and half times more 
often than criminal defendants.272 Represented civil plaintiffs had a 
success rate of 40 percent in the federal appellate courts.273 These 
trends are likely due, at least in part, to case selection: civil attorneys 
are selecting better cases to litigate. 
In addition to identifying these baselines, we also hope to have 
highlighted trends and issues that warrant further study, and which our 
dataset might help address.274 Future projects might pursue the 
attitudinalist angle, seeking to determine whether judicial ideology has 
more explanatory or predictive power than the doctrinal variables we 
have identified. Or, perhaps with the aid of deeper qualitative analysis, 
scholars might be able to further explain why so many apparently weak 
 
 267. See supra Table 12. 
 268. See supra Table 16 (10 percent for intermediate scrutiny cases, as compared to 9 percent 
for the set as a whole). 
 269. See supra notes 189–94 and accompanying text.  
 270. Id. 
 271. See supra Tables 2 & 3.  
 272. See supra Table 4. It would, of course, be equally proper to call this a difference in the 
substance of the claim, not party identity.  
 273. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.  
 274. Hall & Wright, supra note 17, at 87 (identifying this as a basic purpose of content 
analysis). 
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Second Amendment claims are filed in the first place. 
While our primary goal has been to investigate Second 
Amendment doctrine empirically, doing so inevitably raises broader 
questions—and at least some lessons—about doctrinal empiricism 
more broadly. We place ourselves squarely in the camp of those who 
believe that careful, systematic study of case content can yield valuable 
insights about the development and content of law. 
 
